QUIXOTIC HISTORIC

Iraq's revolution fifty years on - laying the path for conflict

2008-07-13T13:22:00.003Z

Tomorrow marks the half century anniversary of one of Iraq's most significant 20th century moments. The July 14 1958 revolution marked the end of the Hashemite monarchy and cut the ties of colonialism that had existed since the Arab Revolt. It ushered in a violent, turbulent and polarising era that would make the country synonymous dictatorship, purges, wars and sectarian bloodshed. The coup d'etat executed by the Iraqi Free officers under the leadership of Abd al-Karim Qasim against the ruling monarchy was swift and brutal. King Faisal II and his family were executed at 8:00am and the military officers took control of Baghdad by noon. Prime Minister Nuri as-Said - having evaded capture on the 14th - was shot dead the following day.

Consquences

International reaction

South Asia’s militarists

2007-11-12T22:20:00.000Z

South Asia is in the grip of a dual crisis - neighbours Iran and Pakistan face invasion and implosion respectively. The latest can be summarized as this: Iran is accused of developing a nuclear weapons programme, exporting terror and generating regional instability; Pakistan has a nuclear weapons programme, has exported and currently is an epicentre of terror, regarded by the West as a vital ally, but now faces an unpredictable internal political crisis. Both countries have arrived at these current states through dramatic upheaval over the last thirty years, but specifically, two individuals Reza Shah Pahlavi and General Zia ul-haq were critical players in this process. It would be easy to criticise the American foreign policy that supported these two regional strongmen, as part of its anti Soviet geopolitical strategy. The lack of foresight and application of realpolitik is a widely distributed critique and not without merit. But more importantly both dictators thrived in post colonial environments, where nationalism, industrialisation and militarism catapulted their respective states into revolution and division. South Asia’s desire to re-assert itself against the West was a stronger dynamic in shaping today’s predicament than misguided American foreign policy.

American support undoubtedly contributed to both leaders dominance. The Shah was considered by his opponents as America’s puppet, although he would gain the upper hand in the relationship after the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973. General Zia seizure of power – including the execution of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto – drew American criticism, but the Pakistani leader re-positioned his country as a vital weapon against the Soviets in Afghanistan during the 1980s. American aid provided the basis for industrialisation for both countries, Iran in the 1960s from the Johnson administration, Pakistan in the 1980s from Carter then Reagan. Arms were the pivot of the dependency. Unprecedented volumes of military equipment were sold to Iran following Nixon’s 1972 carte blanche in exchange for oil revenues; Pakistan acted as the CIA’s conduit, supplying and training the Afghan mujahedin whilst building its own military capacity at the same time. In the post Vietnam era both nations benefited from a relocation of American arms supplies, but it was the ambition of these two leaders that drove their military dictatorships. It was their ambitions that led in different ways to two highly volatile states, now regarded as preeminent international security threats.

The obvious similarity between these two is the critical role designated to them by American Cold War strategy to contain communism. The Shah feared Soviet influence from the early days of his rule, was restored to power by the CIA’s 1953 coup against perceived communist influence, established the brutal security service SAVAK to repress domestic communism, and built up a fearsome military arsenal to counter Soviet influence in Iraq and the Gulf. Zia considered communism the preeminent ideological threat to Islam, cultivated relations with anti-communist hardliners in Washington, and directed Pakistan’s entire military resources in the Afghan-Soviet war.

Domestically both leaders consolidated their power through expansive economic development. The Shah pushed for stratospheric industrialisation fuelled by oil revenues, his ego, and Persian nationalism. Zia presided over modest growth in comparison - seven percent annually - but this development favoured the elites, the military class and Zia political allies. Whilst the Shah used Iran’s natural resource for development, Zia relied on Gulf and American aid. Corruption and economic mismanagement characterised both regimes, eventually creating widespread popular opposition.

The critical constant is Islam, but in totally opposing ways. The Shah acknowledged Shia Islam as part of Persian culture, but presented Pahlavi nationalism as preceding Islam and by implication superior. His extravagances, absolutism and, critically, alliance with the United States alienated the Shia clergy. By focusing on Marxist opposition, the Shia infrastructure – led by Khomeini – was free to develop, laying the path for Islamic revolution. Zia had seen how the power of Islam in Iran shaped politics, so sought to avoid the Shah’s mistakes. Once Zia had seized power, he embarked on an extensive Islamization programme, turning against the grain of Pakistani secular culture, imposing strict Sharia law, restructuring the economy to Islamic precepts, and elevating political party Jamaat e Islami to a central role. Pakistan received vast donations from Saudi Arabia and across the Middle East to establish madrasas and build mosques. Zia encouraged foreign support for both the Afghan jihad and Pakistan’s own Islamic renaissance. But ultimately the consequence of the Shah’s ambivalence and Zia’s proselytizing was the same – the growth of militant Islamism.

The second devastating legacy left by these two autocrats was the proliferation of nuclear technology. The Shah’s nuclear programme – assisted by Kissinger from 1975 - was short-lived and dismantled by Khomeini after 1979, but the infrastructure and expertise plus the very concept of an Iranian bomb remained. Zia’s contribution to South Asia’s nuclear arms race was clearer. Building on the programme established by Bhutto in the early 1970s, Zia pursued an active nuclear agenda – led by AQ Khan – that was ignored by the American leadership, for the sake of preserving Pakistan’s role against the greater Soviet threat. The balance between containment and proliferation always swung to the former in America’s Cold War policy.

Similarities continue in how they managed relations with the West. Both were opportunists, adept at exploiting American geopolitical interests against the backdrop of Cold war policy. The Shah played up the Soviet threat across Iran’s north border, exploited Nixon’s weak foreign policy position through 1972 and 1973, and ultimately received the freedom to purchase any military hardware needed and pursue a hawkish oil policy. Zia likewise seized the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan to re-establish relations in Washington and improve his poor international reputation, then exploited Reagan’s hardline against communism to up the military aid.

American arms policy and pursuit a wider geopolitical interests are commonly cited as factors in the region’s transformation in the last two decades of the Cold war, but it was the extremism that developed during both reigns that dominated. Khomeini’s militant rhetoric was inadvertently cultivated by the Shah’s excesses and American alliance, whilst Zia directly cultivated Islamic extremism, creating prototypes for the Taliban and Al-Qaeda. Just as the Shah pursued his pro Western secular rule to the end – despite fierce clerical opposition; Zia continued his support for the most radical elements in the Afghan jihad - especially Gulbuddin Hekmatyar – until his death.

The consequence of such autocratic behaviour differed in gestation. The Shah’s excesses exploded in Iran at the end of his reign; Zia’s legacy emerged again with a vengeance in the second year of this century in New York. Both leaders left a legacy of resentment, division and brutality. Critically both leaders used American foreign policy and military aid to reinforce their own positions, and while doing so, creating the impression that America only saw South Asian states as pawns against the Soviets. The anti-West sentiment that now exists in South Asia is as much down to the Shah and Zia’s thirst for militarism and its consequences, as it was from American foreign policy.

Algeria's FIS - democratic or theocratic

2007-10-27T16:24:00.000Z

How democratic were the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS)?

The democratization process in Algeria between 1988 and 1992, and subsequent civil war, provides a valuable case study in the debate surrounding the compatibility of democracy and Islam. The period also marks the end of the region’s post-colonial era, characterised by disillusionment with socialism and one party rule; and a transition to a time of political upheaval with Islamist movements seeking power democratically and through violence. At the centre of Algeria’s political crisis was the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), a coalition of contrasting Islamist groups. Although FIS participated in elections at this time, were successful but prevented from assuming power by a military coup; how democratic they were, in provisional municipal power or would have been in parliamentary power, is debatable. Opposing arguments see FIS as either intent on establishing an Islamic theocracy or having the moderation to govern a pluralistic political system.

To consider their democratic credentials, it is possible to look at four key areas: the democratic and Islamic tradition in Algeria, under French colonial rule and the National Liberation Front (FLN); the political events of 1988 – 1992, FIS’ actions and their record in power; the structure of FIS and their leadership at the time; and the international context and role of external influences on Algerian democracy. Beyond Algeria, it is also necessary to look at the debate surrounding the compatibility of Islam and democracy.

The absence of a democratic tradition, the decline in economic and social conditions, and the suppression of Islam in Algeria, created the conditions whereby an Islamist movement like FIS could gain mass popular support. The FLN and the ruling elite’s previous dominance also meant that they were unprepared for loss of power. The policies of the FLN created such dissatisfaction amongst large parts of Algerian society, that rather than aspiring for gradual reform, a large proportion sought radical change. Such strong opposition to the ruling order meant that FIS would face their own internal tensions over what should follow FLN rule.

Algeria’s submergence into the French empire with its mission to civilize restricted Islam’s value. Tocqueville saw Islam as just another feature of Algerian society to be subsumed, doubting its long term influence. Despite this dominance, Algeria retained links to the rest of the Arab Islamic world, through the spread of newspapers, books and journals, plus regular pilgrimages to Mecca.[1] Political Islam developed a more national and parochial nature, with an emphasis on holy men and living saints.[2]

The first resistance came in Islamic form, led by Amir Abd al-Qadir. During a temporary truce in 1837 with France, al-Qadir applied sharia law, prohibiting alcohol, tobacco and gambling; suppressing prostitution and homosexuality.[3] But despite advocating jihad against French rule, he was forced to compromise his principles, conceding land to France and using non-Islamic courts and legal officials to administer secular laws.[4]

In 1931 Abdelhamid Ben Badis formed the Association of Algerian Ulama (AUMA), an organization that gathered Islamic intellectual thought of the time. The AUMA provided a modern progressive message to wider parts of Algerian society, including the mercantile class. Ben Badis believed the goal of re-establishing true Islamic beliefs and practices was compatible with French colonial rule. The AUMA would compromise and co-operate to ensure their preservation. However radical members emerged and the AUMA merged into the FLN and its armed struggle in the war of independence. Parallels between the AUMA and FIS show that Islamic movements have been willing to cooperate with the ruling elites of the time, but as a power struggle emerged the membership radicalised.

AUMA’s apolitical tradition continued with the formation of the al-Qiyam al-Islamiyya (Islamic Values) Association in 1964. In universities during the 1960s intellectual Malek Bennabi, developed his Islamic writings, adopting a Francophone position on Islamic thought. Bennabi perceived democracy as the result of a humanistic cultural development,[5] but rejected Western forms of democracy. His French orientation and scepticism of salafism however limited his influence on the Islamist movement.

In the independent Algeria, Islam was valued by the FLN leaders, although there was a clear separation between religion and state. Democracy and Islam were defined in restrictive terms. At the Tripoli Congress, May-June 1962, a new constitutional program promoted a “popular democratic revolution” and Islam was to be “stripped of all excrescences and superstitions that have smothered or corrupted it”.[6] The compromises made to Islamist groups under the FLN, prevented a full explosion of Islamic activism, but also encouraged their confidence and expanded their role within Algerian society.

So as the FLN issued decrees from the 1970s onwards - covering gambling, alcohol or seminars on Islamic thought – Islamists rejected this expanding state monopoly.[7] The incorporation of Islam into the state apparatus provided the political impetus for Islamists and led to the first instances of violence in Ben Aknoun, November 1982. Algerian Islamists had a stronger determination, than other dissident groups, to violently oppose the established order.[8] An uncompromising opposition in Algerian universities in the early 1980s and the emergence of militant groups like the Mouvement Algérien Islamique Armé (MAIA); contrasted to future leader Abassi Madani’s temperate and independent approach that rejected armed struggle. The fragmented nature of the Islamist movement was a major hindrance in the 1980s and would remain so with the creation of FIS.

Algerian society polarized as FLN economic policies favoured the Francophone population. A well-educated but unemployed Arabic-speaking generation had the intellectual training and political awareness to mobilise opposition.[9] Poor governance and corruption amongst the ruling elite added to the disillusionment. Opposition to the FLN also emerged from the failure to fulfil the expectations of the war of independence - this disappointment led to Islamism becoming the inheritor of the revolutionary mantle of Algerian national identity.[10] As Madani would state in 1990: “The Algerian state of 1962 had nothing to do with what had been projected on 1st November 1954, for which we had taken up arms: an independent state founded on Islamic principles. The state that has risen before our eyes was founded on secular, socialist principles. This was a serious deviation.”[11]

The structure of the FLN and their monopoly on political expression meant that Algeria’s opposition, when it was permitted, lacked political sophistication and often made unreasoned pronouncements on policies.[12] After gaining independence, the new leaders, in fear of a pluralistic society, built a strong state that required unity around the ideology of nationalism.[13] Political opposition could only develop in mosques, madrassas and universities; as a result, it took on an Islamic nature and was prevalent amongst the young unemployed. Prior to 1988, there was an absence of a political class: “the professional class, the intellectual bourgeoisie, has been deliberately excluded from politics. They have no expertise and no political experience”.[14] This void allowed FIS to flourish as an opposition movement.

The final and probably most damaging flaw in FLN rule was their economic mismanagement. By 1986, nearly 75% of Algerians aged between 16 and 25 were unemployed; national debt was $24.6bn in 1987; and oil and gas revenues (Algeria’s primary export) fell by 40% in 1986-7.[15] Restoring economic stability became the defining political issue in the late 1980s.

With all these failures, the emergence of the FIS was not surprising, although unexpected by FLN leaders. The desire for a complete change of political system had developed over the previous 20 years, resulting in a rejection of FLN’s socialist ideology. For a significant proportion of the Algerian electorate in June 1990, Islam was perceived as the alternative.

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The breaking point for Algerian society came at the October 1988 riots. The demonstrations were widespread but Islamist groups only participated a few days after the initial eruption. Discontent with economic conditions was a major factor in the riots, but journalists, attorneys, and academics also protested against freedom of speech, legal independence and torture respectively.[16] With no obvious organizer of the protests, the Islamists assumed the de facto leadership, even though the demonstrations represented a wide selection of grievances. The resolution of the protests came after President Chadli met with Islamist leaders including Madani and Ali Belhadj. This meeting provided an opportunity for the FLN elite to re-connect with the Algerian people, and also for Islamists to use the political system to their favour.

The 1989 Constitution that followed guaranteed “freedom of expression, of association and assembly”, but did not permit political associations to base their actions on religious, linguistic or regionalist ingredients.[17] Despite this, Chadli and the National Assembly overlooked the ambiguities and FIS was formally endorsed in September 1989. This decision partly reflected genuine democratic reforms and confidence that FIS would conform to the democratic rules. It also reflected Chadli’s desire to suppress FLN opposition; potentially split the Islamist movement; renew his own international support against the expansion of the Islamist movement.[18] FIS used this new recognition to mobilise their supporters, through mosques, newspapers, leaflets and rallies. FIS chose to trust the government[19] and its promises of democratic reform, and joined other newly formed groups under a multi-party system. Chadli also encouraged economic liberalization.

Despite the promise of a new system, the lack of pre-existing institutional and financial structures for supporting a pluralistic system, and lack of conviction that engagement in political debate was worthwhile or safe[20], meant that political activism was hesitant amongst new political parties. In contrast, FIS relied on its solid history of political Islamic organization, to give itself an advantage.

The political programme of the FIS was instigated by the March 1989 policy document Projet du Front Islamique du Salut. The document, described as structurally and thematically disorganized, is more a self-justification, mixing Islam with a demonstration of national pride, than a programme for resolving massive social problems,[21] proclaiming that “FIS has adopted a moderate political approach”.[22] The abolition of the state monopoly, usury and intermediaries, was to be replaced by private ventures and free competition.[23] This aspect of their political programme appealed directly to the entrepreneurial middle class.

Whilst FIS prepared for forthcoming elections in June 1990, details emerged of their local activities, raising concerns over how any future rule might be. Intimidation and violence against journalists and women opposed to their views; and the emergence of an Islamic police force, were attributed to FIS activists.[24] In the build up to the elections, the FIS leadership presented a nationalist and non-violent message, aimed at alleviating FLN fears and widening their support. Madani rejected violence, maintained openness towards and coexistence with other political parties, and stated that political alliances were possible if “in compliance with the interests of the country”.[25] Democracy was seen as a means, rather than a political end, but was not to be repealed after gaining power: “Democracy is opening up the opportunity for the people so as it chooses the alternative it wants and a leadership to represent it. If democracy has this meaning, we must adopt democracy as a way of life. As for the allegation that we want to embrace democracy and deny it the day we reach power firstly, was this found in the project of our political programme? Was it found in our official statement? No it was not.”[26]

A multiparty system was declared feasible by Madani: “The presence of numerous parties and numerous bodies is necessary for the serious management of the nation's affairs.”[27] FIS also showed commitment to democratic accountability by urging the creation of a multi-party committee including constitutional lawyers to oversee the local elections.[28] However FIS’ fragmented structure meant that contrasting messages on democracy emerged; Belhadj consistently stated his opposition to pluralism and democracy, whilst Madani represented the moderate viewpoint.

At the same time, the “democratic opposition” made up of other political organizations demonstrated in support of democracy in opposition to FIS activism. Businessmen, women’s rights and Berber activists, voiced opposition to both the FLN and FIS, fearing the replacement of one dictatorship with another.[29]

FIS presented a mixed message when it came to women’s rights. Women’s rights were curtailed in FIS controlled areas – imposition of the hijab, restrictions of speech, extra surveillance – but women also acted as “guardians of moral order” and there was also “militant women, including university women, who worked extremely hard for the charitable associations and for the [FIS] electoral campaign.”[30] Madani proposed the establishment of FIS women’s section and large numbers of women attended rallies prior to the 1990 election.[31]

The true test of any democratization process is elections. In the June 1990 municipal elections, FIS gained the majority vote in 853 of 1,539 communes (Assemblée Populaire Communale). They also won the majority in 32 wilayas or provinces (Assemblée Populaire de Wilaya) from a total of 48. It has to be noted that 34.85% of the population did not vote.[32] Madani sought to enhance FIS’ democratic credentials firstly by emphasizing their electoral participation, but also reiterating that the victory had been achieved with the help of the women’s vote and that an opposition must exist if Algeria was to achieve economic, political and intellectual renewal.[33]

Criticisms of FIS and fears over its future rule were widespread. The advent of a FIS national government would lead to the implementation of sharia law, believed Said Saadi, who represented Kabyle Berber interests. As leader of the secular Rally for Culture and Democracy and opposed to both FLN and FIS, he believed that ''without a satisfactory solution to the people's lack of confidence, we face either the helmet (of the military) or the turban (of the Islamic fundamentalists).''[34] The lack of democratic tradition meant the electorate had an uncomfortable choice. Tahar Bensmina, an independent candidate: ''If national elections were held now, the FLN would certainly win because, as unhappy as people are, they would fear the others' inexperience.''[35] The electorate faced stark choices between FLN economic incompetence and untested Islamist policies. The vote for the FIS was a protest vote against the FLN by a large part of the electorate, but there was also a genuine appeal to FIS’ Islamic principles.

FIS social policies were also scrutinized as they managed welfare services in local poor communities. This included housing projects and work for the unemployed, the expansion of the FIS mosque network and the Islamization of education.[36] FIS’ attempts to govern locally were hindered by the poor mismanagement of previously FLN run administrations and by government tactics to prevent progress.[37] Concerns that administrations would install strict social policies were not misplaced, FIS municipalities brought in controls over Raï music, co-educational schools and clothing shortly after the election.[38] Doubts existed over their ability to move from municipal to national rule, where decisions of state and management of the economy were needed. The economist Rachid Mimouni: ''The ideology they preach is not capable of running a modern country and leading the economy out of catastrophe''.[39]

FLN attempts to regain the political initiative came through the approval of a new electoral bill in April 1991. The law included the creation of new assembly seats, predominantly in southern Algeria where the FLN had its strongest support. Discontent with these FLN gerrymandering tactics led to a radicalisation in the expression of FIS opposition, as general strikes and demonstrations were called; the government responded by declaring a state of siege and then arresting Madani and Belhadj. The FIS were accused of challenging the system, undermining state security and obstructing the democratic process; but they were merely a responding to an undemocratic law.[40]

Although Madani stated that he was “ready to embark on [further] elections, but with guarantees”[41], divisions within the FIS emerged during the demonstrations and many political actors, especially radical activists, turned their backs on the opportunities created by the democratic transition.[42] Under pressure from repressive government measures, the usually moderate Madani issued statements on the right to jihad and preparedness to fight the military if demonstrations were blocked. Preserving a democratic image was still important to the FIS: “We want laws that will allow the people a free choice and a cleansing of the political climate”.[43] However the militant wing of FIS gathered pace after these confrontations with the state and less democratic influences became more influential.

FLN leaders were prepared to maintain FIS’ inclusion in the democratic process prior to the December 1991 legislative elections. With the imprisonment of FIS’ leadership and from a perceived position of strength, FLN leaders were able to make concessions that, it was hoped, would lead to an Islamist party that was domesticated and when integrated into the institutional system would not question the political survival of the regime.[44] Despite real damage to the democratic credentials of both sides during the unrest in May-June 1991, a commitment to democracy from both remained. Abdelkader Hachani, provisional FIS leader, stated in August 1991: “We can not arrive in power other than through free and proper elections”.[45] President Bendjedid announced in October 1991: “The democratic process goes on, as pluralism has entered the political arena, and democracy has become an optimum way of running the affairs of the nation and keeping abreast of the age.”[46]

After the December 1991 election, criticisms of FIS adherence to the democratic process came in the form of accusations of ballot rigging, intimidation and loss of 900,000 electoral cards in their municipalities.[47] Despite ongoing criticisms of FIS’ democratic credentials from opposition parties, the FLN were prepared to accept FIS as sufficiently democratic to participate and potentially form a government of national unity, after victory in the first ballot on 26 December 1991. Links between FLN’s Islamic wing and FIS had developed in late 1991 and when faced with a requirement to cooperate with other political forces, FIS also adopted a more nationalist stance, including accepting Berber culture.[48] Accusations of possibly changing the constitution or establishing popular tribunals to try FIS enemies were explicitly denied.[49] Hachani issued statements at this time that presented a moderate and tolerant message, but were carefully qualified by adherence to Islamic principles: “FIS will guarantee individual and collective liberties in the framework of Islamic law and will tolerate the existence of parties other than Islamic ones”.[50]

Despite the undemocratic actions of the military in forcing President Chadli Benjedid to resign, effectively undertaking a coup d’état and dissolving FIS, it was the Islamist movement that was denounced as having no interest in democracy. The crisis was blamed on FIS, even though they had simply adhered to the democratic process as encouraged. Mohammed Boudiaf: “FIS tried to use democracy in order to liquidate democracy. The use of Islam for political and partisan aims, and also the resorting to democracy and lies found….listening ears from amongst the deprived and marginalised sections of the population.”[51] Boudiaf put the Islamist electoral success down to exploitation of the younger generation’s despair and compared FIS to French fascists.[52]

Concerns had developed amongst the Algerian population from a combination of FIS municipal rule, increasing militancy from mid 1991 and ambiguous statements on what their Islamic rule would entail. But the end of a democratic process came as much from the reluctance of the ruling elite and the military to give up the power hard fought-for during Algeria’s war of independence, as the population’s fear of the unknown. Despite Madani’s statements of moderation, the democratic process had not advanced enough for the ruling elite to relinquish their position. Boudiaf, as the mouthpiece of the military junta, tried to portray the action as protecting democracy, but this was not convincing when thousands of FIS activists were tortured and sent to detention centres, newspapers were banned and mosques and welfare centres closed.[53] As Hocine Ait Ahmed, leader of the Socialist Forces Front, said: “They won’t make anyone believe that stopping the electoral process is a democratic advance”.[54]

The Sant' Egidio Platform of January 1995 was an attempt to end the civil war that followed the coup. Alongside other political parties opposed to the military junta, including the FLN, FIS rejected violence, called for the release of Madani and Belhadj, and made clear statements about adherence to democratic principles. These included respect for “alternation of power through universal suffrage”; “respect for popular legitimacy”; “the guarantee of fundamental liberties, individual and collective, regardless of race, sex, confession or language”; and the “consecration of pluralism”.[55] The proposals in Rome were a significant shift for FIS, despite mixed statements from their representatives Rabah Kebir and Anwar Haddam towards relations with militant groups, and doubts over whether the imprisoned leadership accepted the proposals.[56] The rejection of the Rome plan by the Algerian government shows again that the regime had little true interest in democratic principles. Likewise the simultaneously rejection by the GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé) shows that violent groups were still able to undermine FIS’ credibility as a democratic movement.

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The personalities, structure and influences of FIS are critical to understanding how democratic the movement was. Shortly after the approval of the new constitution in February 1989, the new organization Front Islamique du Salut was formed, with Madani as president and Belhadj as deputy. Disputes over the merits of an Islamic political party meant that FIS was regarded as a breakaway from the Islamist movement. The absence of several leading Islamist figures meant that it was able to pursue a more popular and political course.[57] The link between Algeria’s older generation of preachers (religious Islamists) and the new politicians (reformist Islamists) was seen in Madani’s leadership.[58]

Madani had been involved in the FLN fight against France, giving him personal legitimacy and credibility when criticising their post independence failures; and also acting as a continuity of the FLN’s revolutionary ideals and hegemony, although in an Islamic guise.[59] He had an overseas education, making him more open to conflicting political and religious ideals. Madani was consistent in his moderate tone. Belhadj, also a preacher, had no experience of the world outside Algeria, which fed into his denouncements of democracy as a tool of the West. His hardline attitude towards democracy and the FLN also came from a strict Arabic education and less privileged background than other Islamist activists. Both leaders were influenced in their development as Islamic activists by Bennabi, Sayyid Qutb, and Abu Al-Ala al-Mawdudi. Madani had attended rallies in support of Qutb and studied under Bennabi. Belhadj also cited Algerian Islamists as being influential.[60]

Madani’s views on Algeria’s political future are not dissimilar to Bennabi’s. Alongside other moderate FIS activists - Abdelkader Bachani, Rabah Kebir, Anwar Baddam – Madani was committed to an "Algerian" solution to Algerian problems. Inspired by the writings of Bennabi, that rejected all internationalist models of Islamic society; he believed in an electoral strategy for assuming power and supported the idea of gradually applying the sharia to Algerian society.[61] As the leading advocate of democracy in FIS, Madani argued that the Islamic version was superior to the liberal and socialist model[62], and that it represented the best opportunity for justice, freedom and equality. Democratisation was seen by Madani as a means of achieving Islamic goals, but the sharia held precedence, and once in power they would review anything judged incompatible with the sharia.[63] Madani sought a unique Algerian democratic model neither FLN nor Western influenced.

In contrast, Belhadj, with other sympathisers of Mustafa Bouyali’s MAIA, represented the confrontational and often militant wing of FIS. The radical message of Belhadj – “In Islam sovereignty belongs to the divine Law; in democracy, sovereignty belongs to the people, to the mob and to charlatans”[64] – was uncompromising and although Madani attempted to temper his rhetoric, it led parts of the electorate to see FIS as undemocratic. His religious background underpinned many of his statements: “Democracy is a stranger in the House of God. There is no democracy in Islam”[65]. By equating democracy with blasphemy and emphasizing the religious side of FIS’ struggle for power, Belhadj was able to mobilise a large segment of the population who saw Islam as the alternative future, but at the same time he also allowed militant activists to strengthen their influence.

Although Madani often made attempts to pave over cracks in FIS rhetoric after Belhadj’s outburst, he could not alter the fundamental splits in the movements structure. On one side were the preachers/reformers like Madani with an adaptive, evolutionary and social approach; on the other side were the Salafi radicals/revolutionaries who were Arabophone, confrontational and influenced by Qutb: Belhadj, Said Mekhloufi and future GIA leaders. A third group overlapped both wings, the technocrats had Western university backgrounds and represented professional classes: scientists, engineers and physicians. Abdelkader Hachani fell into this category.[66] Beyond ideological contrasts, the hierarchical structure did not allow a consistent level of communication amongst FIS acitivists. Decisions were made mostly by a Majlis Shura consisting of 35 members, but the exact composition was unknown and only Madani regularly spoke to the media.[67] With such a structure, it was impossible to have on every level, consistent stances on democracy, women’s rights or political pluralism.

FIS mass support lay in poor urban areas that suffered most hardship from the FLN’s economic failure. Belhadj used the October 1988 unrest to promote FIS as the true representatives of their interests. Middle class traders and entrepreneurs also supported FIS, in anticipation of a more liberal economic alternative to the FLN, but this support declined between the 1990 and 1991 elections, as fears grew of the movement’s real intentions.[68] The strong support that developed amongst the Hittists [69] came through improvements in social services and local amenities. However support for idealistic democratic principles was a lower priority than economic policies, given the sharp decline in living conditions that had occurred in the 1980s.

Internal tensions developed after the arrests of Madani and Belhadj, but had already emerged after three founding members publicly criticized FIS tactics: “we should not have entered the municipal elections…we should have begun to form the nation, form the youth, and to explain the meaning of true Islam”; accused militant forces of gaining influence: “corrupt elements have infiltrated the ranks of the FIS and have begun to add fuel to the flames”; and denounced Madani as dangerous.[70] Judging how democratic the FIS were in their first few years is hindered by this fractured structure. Although Madani was the primary mouthpiece for the movement, he had a range of contrasting views below him.

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When Madani was asked whether democracy existed in the Algerian arena, he responded: “No we endeavour to raise democracy higher to the freedom of Islam in its largest, most honest and complete sense.”[71] As the leader of Islamist party, his adherence to democratic principles can be regarded as surprising, not just because of the absence of democratic tradition in Algeria, but also due to historical difficulties in combining Islam and democracy. Madani and Belhadj would provide conflicting arguments on their compatibility. The political parties opposed to FIS maintain that by its very nature, as an Islamist movement, it could not be democratic.

Elements of traditional Islamic thought give an understanding of how compatible democracy and Islam are. The Islamic scholar Mawdudi stated that the political system was based on three principles: Tawheed (Unity of God), Risalat (Prophethood) and Khilafat (Caliphate).[72] It is argued that it is impossible to have an Islamic democracy, because the sovereignty of the people conflicts with the Tawheed concept that there is no God but God – i.e. the sovereignty of God.[73] Authority and laws are made by God not man, as in a democracy. Islam, from the viewpoint of political philosophy, is therefore the very antithesis of secular Western democracy as it repudiates the philosophy of popular sovereignty.[74] Mawdudi’s view does not reject democracy outright, rather it advocates a theocracy ruled by the whole community of Muslims, described as a “theo-democracy”.[75]

However the capacity for an Islamic democracy can be developed through Islamic concepts of independent interpretive judgement (ijtihad), consensus (ijma) and consultation (shura).[76] The commitment to ijtihad was interpreted by FIS activists that no entity has a monopoly on interpreting the kind of political order God intends, so secularists have as much right to rule as Islamists.[77] Ijma can provide an effective basis for accepting majority rule, offering legitimacy to an Islamic democracy and a procedure to carry it out.[78]

This liberal Islamic view sees the shura as critical to the argument of compatibility with democracy. FIS activists proposed the shura as an Algerian governing body.[79] FIS’ political programme of 1989, indicated that the shura would permit the “elimination of political, economic and social oppression and monopoly….will make the principle of equality one of its main lines of action, alongside a policy which aims to raise the restrictions on public freedoms”.[80]

The shura ensures ongoing scrutiny of the decisionmaking process and also involves representatives of all classes, including those who have no chance of winning an election, in consensusbuilding.[81] However it is debatable whether consultation is a duty of the ruler; he is bound by the decisions of those consulted; they are his own choice or the elected representatives, members of political parties, religious specialists or community leaders; or whether they decide by majority-rule.[82] The relative merits of shura based rule versus democracy are also clouded by negative views of Western ideologies. An unemployed nineteen-year-old from Algiers said, “I’m opposed to democracy because it’s a western invention. It isn’t Islamic. I support the FIS, so I support the shura.” Asked what the shura was, he continued: “The shura is Islamic. It means that the people can decide their own destiny”.[83]

Western democracy has developed over longer periods than in the Middle East or Africa, so using the normative Western definition of democracy is problematic. In addition, Arab regimes have used the term selectively, referring to themselves as “democratic”[84], without any clear democratic principles. Belhadj denounced democracy as a Western concept, but this derived as much from a Qutb influenced anti-West and anti-liberal ideology than actual opposition to the tenets of democracy. FIS leaders believed the West used double standards when advocating democracy.

***

The development of the Islamist movement in Algeria was far from unique. The struggle for political power was mirrored in other North African states from the 1970s onwards. As the post colonial governments faltered economically, politically and socially; and pluralistic politics was suppressed in one party states across the region, a false idea of democracy was presented by ruling elites. The democratization process that occurred in the late 1980s in Algeria was repeated in Egypt and Jordan, then Tunisia and Morocco in the 1990s. Islamist movements were in the ascendancy in Afghanistan, Palestine, Sudan and Lebanon[85]; and democratic forces gained major impetus from the collapse of communism in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.[86] Just as solidarity existed amongst North African governments when they formed a task force to combat radical Islam a few months before the 1992 coup;[87] the FIS also gained solidarity abroad. Their democratic credentials were defined by these relations.

A large proportion of FIS’ funding was received from Saudi Arabia through the World Daawa League, and although a puritan Wahhabist influence fed into municipal morality policies, the influence was generally moderate and as a counterweight to Iranian militant Islamism.[88] Criticisms of FIS’ democratic principles often came through inaccurate comparisons to other Islamist groups in the region, especially Iran. The influence of the Iranian revolution on Algeria’s Islamists was limited to the early 1980s; and Madani and Belhadj emphasised theological differences when asked of similarities.[89]

The possibility of an Iranian style theocracy in the southern Mediterranean was an alarming prospect for western diplomats and politicians. The fear of Islamic fundamentalism clouded the West’s views on the democratic intentions of FIS. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejian stated opposition to the possibility of “One man, one vote, one time” in Algeria prior to the 1991 elections, doubting FIS long term democratic intentions. Madani and Belhadj were critical of the United States action during the Gulf war, their economic power and double standards regarding democracy. But Madani maintained that he desired a constructive cooperative relationship with the United States based upon recognition of Algeria’s autonomy.[90] In contrast, Western attitudes at this time perceived Islam as inherently extremist and treated it as a single or monolithic force.[91]

The lack of condemnation of the 1992 coup from the West was borne out of a desire to maintain regional stability, rather than a fear (or understanding) of FIS itself. By 1995 and the Sant' Egidio negotiations, the West, in particular France and the United States, adopted a more even handed position – calling for dialogue with moderate Islamists.[92] Having seen how the Algerian government lacked any serious democratic credentials, the West slowly developed a better understanding of how democratic FIS were.

Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and FIS’ reaction was a turning point for relations with the ruling elite, in particular the armed forces, and also internally as radical undemocratic elements became more assertive. Madani visited Iraq to defend Saddam Hussein in 1990, but also opposing the annexation of Kuwait. This position shifted to a pro Iraqi one, as Belhadj called for the formation of volunteer force to confront the West. This move was perceived by the armed forces as an intrusion into their turf,[93] and ended Saudi Arabia’s financial support. This support was replaced by jihadist groups involved in the war in Afghanistan.

Smaller Islamic groups had merged to form FIS’ including the local chapter of the South Asian Jamaat al-Tabligh, who were involved in recruiting young Algerians to the Afghan jihad.[94] The Afghan veteran fringe in FIS was a small minority but as anti-government protests became more violent in mid 1991, its actions undermined the movements democratic credentials. After the 1992 coup, the Afghan fringe formed the GIA, taking with it some of FIS’ more radical members, and in turn targetting its former colleagues as well.

***

A judgement of FIS’ democratic credentials can be achieved by analysing Algeria’s democratic tradition and the Islamist movement’s organizational structure, as these two factors directly influenced their actions between 1988 and 1992. The absence of a democratic tradition meant that neither the ruling elite nor FIS had matured enough to cope with any political transition. FIS needed a longer period to overcome internal disputes and be able to present a unified democratic message, the ruling elite’s experiment with democracy was corrupted by an authoritarian past with no real interest in long term democratic reform.

The fragmented structure and the contradictory statements from FIS leaders means that contrasting conclusions can be made. Whilst Madani was the public face during the 1988 – 1992 period; other more radical elements gathered momentum. With this in mind, how democratic FIS would have been in full power is debatable. The extreme level of resistance to the military junta firstly by the AIS (Islamic Salvation Army) and then the GIA, indicates that these elements would have looked to dominate FIS. The salafi wing of FIS rejected democracy as it conflicted with the concept of Tawhid, but for moderates like Madani - FIS had a nationalist and pluralist agenda that looked to create economic and social reform through democracy.

[1] Benjamin Stora, Algeria: 1830 – 2000, (Ithaca: London, 2001), p.11
[2] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.13
[3] Ibid, p.4
[4] Ibid, p.5
[5] Zoubir, Yahia H, ‘Algerian Islamists' conception of democracy’ , Arab Studies Quarterly (ASQ), 22.6.1996
[6] Benjamin Stora, Algeria: 1830 – 2000, (Ithaca: London, 2001), p.125
[7] Ibid, p.171
[8] Algeria: The Revolution Institutionalized – John P. Entelis, p.85
[9] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.52
[10] Ibid, p.101-2
[11] Slimane Zeghidour, "Entretien avec Abbasi Madani," Politique Etrangere, No. 49, 1990, p. 180. quoted in Takeyh, R., ‘Islamism in Algeria: A struggle between hope and agony’, Middle East Policy, Summer 2003
[12] James Ciment, Algeria: The Fundamentalist Challenge, (New York, 1997), p.131
[13] Andrew J. Pierre & William B. Quandt, The Algerian crisis : policy options for the West, (Washington, 1996), p.6
[14] Peter Ford, ‘Unnamed Western Diplomat quoted in Algeria's Tortuous Road to Democracy’, Christian Science Monitor, 10.10.1991,
[15] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.99-100
[16] Benjamin Stora, Algeria: 1830 – 2000, (Ithaca: London, 2001), p.196
[17] Mohand Salah Tahi, ‘The Arduous Democratisation Process in Algeria’,The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 30, No. 3. (Sep., 1992), pp. 397-419.
[18] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.119-121
[19] Frederic Volpi, Islam and Democracy: The Failure of Dialogue in Algeria, (London: Sterling, 2003), p.47
[20] Ibid, p.47
[21] Ahmed Rouadjia, Discourse and Strategy of the Algerian Islamist Movement (1986-1992), in Laura Guazzone, (ed.), The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World, (Reading, 1995), p.80-81
[22] Ibid p.81
[23] Ibid, p.83
[24] Francis Ghiles, ‘FLN still looks backwards as Algeria seeks a way forward’, Financial Times (London,England), 28.11.1989, AND Peter Hiett, ‘Algerian police to investigate security force’, The Guardian, 23.11.1989
[25] Algeria Islamic Salvation Front Leader Interviewed After Meeting with President Benjedid, Algerian TV – 8 1.1990
[26] Algeria Islamic Leader Sets Out His Party’s Policies, Algerian TV, 27 2.1990
[27] Ibid
[28] Philip Shehadi of Reuters, ‘Muslims show their strength at Algiers rally’, The Independent, 21.4.1990
[29] Francis Ghiles, ‘Algerians demonstrate in support of democracy’, Financial Times, 11.5.1990
[30]Rabia Bekkar; Hannah Davis, ‘Taking Up Space in Tlemcen: The Islamist Occupation of Urban Algeria’, Middle East Report, No. 179, Islam, The State and Democracy. (Nov. - Dec., 1992), pp. 11-15.
[31] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.134
[32] Algerian agency comments on FIS victory in elections, APS in English, 17.6.1990
[33] Susan MacDonald, ‘Poll results in Algeria bring Islamic state nearer’, The Times, 14.6.1990
[34] Howard LaFranchi, ‘Local Elections Are First Step For Democracy, but Most Algerians Want More’, Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), 12.6.1990
[35] Ibid
[36] Rabia Bekkar; Hannah Davis, ‘Taking Up Space in Tlemcen: The Islamist Occupation of Urban Algeria’, Middle East Report, No. 179, Islam, The State and Democracy. (Nov. - Dec., 1992), pp. 11-15.
[37] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.160
[38] Algeria Islamic Salvation Front supporters impose morality controls, Radio France Internationale, 14.7.1990
[39] Howard LaFranchi, ‘Algerians Test Support for Islam in Free Vote’, Christian Science Monitor (Boston, MA), 7.6.1990
[40] John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.164
[41] Abassi Madani, speech to party rally in Oran, 3.5.1991, Summary of World Broadcasts
[42] Frederic Volpi, Islam and Democracy: The Failure of Dialogue in Algeria, (London: Sterling, 2003), p.51
[43] Rabah Kebbir, head of the FIS political commission, quoted in Peter Ford, ‘Algeria's Tortuous Road to Democracy’, Christian Science Monitor, 10.10.1991
[44] Francois Burgat, Islamic Movements in North Africa, (London, 1994), p.299
[45] Interview with Abdelkader Hachani, Algérie Actualité, 1.8.1991
[46] Algerian President Announces Elections for 26th December 1991, Algerian TV, Algiers, in Arabic, 15.10.1991, Text of address to the nation by President Chadli Bendjedid
[47] Fundamentalists accused of ballot rigging, intimidation, Agence France Presse, 30.12.1991 AND Francis Ghiles, ‘Establishment takes fright at Algeria election results’, Financial Times, 2.1.1992
[48] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.238
[49] Ibid, p.239
[50] Ibid, pp.239-240
[51] Boudiaf says Algeria needs ''Radical change'' to escape from crisis, Algerian TV, Algiers, in Arabic, 22.4.1992
[52] Algeria Boudiaf holds news conference for foreign journalists, Algerian TV, Algiers, in Arabic, 16.2.1992
[53] John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.166
[54] Jonathan Randall, ‘Algerian Elections Cancelled’, Washington Post, 13.1.1992
[55] Platform for a Political and Peaceful Solution to the Algerian Crisis, 13 January 1995
[56] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.345
[57] Ibid p.117
[58] John P. Entelis, Political Islam in the Maghreb: The Non Violent Dimension, in Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa, (Bloomington, Ind., 1997), ed. John P. Entelis, p.59
[59] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.102
[60] Ibid, p.151
[61] John P. Entelis, Political Islam in the Maghreb: The Non Violent Dimension, in Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa, (Bloomington, Ind., 1997), ed. John P. Entelis, p.57
[62] John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.159
[63] Azzedine Layachi, Political Liberalisation and the Islamist Movement in Algeria in Bonner, M., Reif, M., & Tessler, M. (ed.s), Islam, democracy and the state in Algeria: lessons for the western Mediterranean and beyond, (London, 2005), p.58
[64] M. Al-Ahnaf, B. Botiveau, F. Frégosi.El Mounquid, no.23, L’Algérie par ses islamistes, p.93
[65] Alger Republicain, December 1989, quoted in L’Algérie – Catherine Belvaude, p.108
[66] John P. Entelis, Political Islam in the Maghreb: The Non Violent Dimension, in Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa, (Bloomington, Ind., 1997), ed. John P. Entelis, p.60
[67] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.149
[68] Gilles Keppel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, (London, 2003), pp.168-169
[69] Translated as “those leaning against the wall”. Slang for the urban poor unemployed.
[70] Algeria FIS founder members criticise Madani in Television appearance, Algerian TV, Algiers, in Arabic, 29.6.1991
[71] Algeria Islamic Salvation Front Leader Interviewed After Meeting with President Benjedid, Algerian TV, 8.1.1990
[72] al-Mawdudi quoted in John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.23
[73] John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.23
[74] Abu’l A’la Mawdudi, Political Theory of Islam in Khurshid, A., Islam: Its Meaning and Message, (Leicester, 1976)
[75] Ibid
[76] John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.27
[77] James Ciment, Algeria: The Fundamentalist Challenge, (New York, 1997), p.12
[78] John. O. Voll & John L. Esposito, ‘Islam’s Democratic Essence’, Middle East Quarterly, September 1994
[79] Mamoun Fandy, ‘Algerian Opposition Isn't 'Fundamentalist'’, Christian Science Monitor, 17.6.1991
[80] Ahmed Rouadjia, Discourse and Strategy of the Algerian Islamist Movement (1986-1992), in Laura Guazzone, (ed.), The Islamist Dilemma: The Political Role of Islamist Movements in the Contemporary Arab World, (Reading, 1995), p.82
[81] Ehud Ya'ari, ‘Democracy and Shuracracy’, The Jerusalem Report, 27.6.1991
[82] Gudrun Kramer, ‘Islamist Notions of Democracy’, Middle East Report, No. 183, Political Islam (Jul. - Aug., 1993), pp. 2-8
[83] Difraoui, Abdelasiem el-. 1994. La critique du système démocratique par le Front islamique du Salut. In Keppel, G. (ed.), Exils et royaumes, (Paris, 1994), 105–24
[84] Francois Burgat, Islamic Movements in North Africa, (London, 1994), p.125
[85] Paul Berman: Terror And Liberalism, New York 2003, p.155-156 and Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda: Casting a shadow of terror, (London, 2003), p.181
[86] William A. Zarman, The International Politics of Democracy in North Africa, in Islam, Democracy and the State in North Africa, (Bloomington, Ind., 1997), ed. John P. Entelis, p.209
[87] John Esposito & John Voll, Islam and Democracy, (New York: Oxford, 1996), p.166
[88] Michael Willis, The Islamist Challenge in Algeria, (New York,1997), p.151
[89] Ibid, p.150
[90] John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality, (New York: Oxford, 1999), p.180
[91] Robin Wright, ‘Islam, Democracy and the West’, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1992
[92] Roula Khalaf, ‘Algerian opposition parties draft peace plan’, Financial Times, 12.1.1995
[93] Gilles Keppel, Jihad: The Trail of Political Islam, (London, 2003), p.172
[94] John Cooley, Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism, (London, 2002), p.167

And on the 6th day, God created.....

2007-06-06T22:32:00.000Z

Justifiably a whole range of articles, documentaries and images have focused this week on the Middle Eastern events of June 1967 and their longstanding legacy. The changes to the region primarily geographically, but politically and demographically as well, have shaped the painful chain of events that has led to the dire situation now witnessed. To the Israelis, victory has been a poisoned chalice. Although in a dominant position after their 6-day victory, the moral high ground has since been eroded and international respect diminished with the burden of occupiers, also, critically, there is still no guaranteed security. For the Palestinians, more displacement followed, with less possibilities for creating coherent political leadership or institutions, but for the first they became central to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Despite this, the manipulation by Arab despots of the Palestine question continued.

The war created, as many wars do, extremism on both sides. For the victors, the occupation of the West Bank meant that ancient ambitions for a Greater Israel could be fulfilled. Despite their political and strategic value, the settlements have always been spiritually fuelled. The dominant party of the 1980s - Likud - would combine political with the religious, in their policies. Islamic extremism would take longer to develop in Palestine itself, but its original source did develop from the 1967 aftermath. The Muslim Brotherhood expanded rapidly in Egypt, after Nasser's defeat and the discrediting of Arab socialism. The failure of this ideology embolden another; Islamism strengthen in Egypt and created the foundations for Hamas to rise in the late 1980s.

Nasserist politics had been in decline prior to 67, but Egypt's defeat confirmed the sense of failure that had existed in the Arab world since decolonisation. Critically, the Arabs attributed Israel's victory to their adoption of a religious formula. Nasser's reforms had expanded the education system but created vast urban populations. A restless educated generation was looking for a new direction. Religious political movements were able to provide this. The 1967 defeat created confusion and a power vacuum in Egyptian society, which would be filled by Islamism.

Likewise prior to 1967, Israeli nationalism had a strong socialist tradition. This continued, but expansion into historic Judea and Samaria was ultimately religiously and nationalist motivated. The occupation of the West Bank originally had limited practical use, but was a powerful bargaining chip. Arab rejection of negotiation left Israel with excess territory and fed territorial maximisation - a central mantra of Likud. It also presented religious political parties with a new quest for Israel: expansion into historic territory that once made up ancient Israel. Archeology certainly flourished as the settler movement did.

The 1967 war re-shaped the region in many ways, but also re-awakened religious sentiments formed thousands of years prior. Since these sentiments drive the extremism and the polarisation we now see today, maybe we should look to analyse and understand them first, if we want to find a solution.

The New Cold War?

2007-06-03T17:07:00.000Z

Despite a recent rejection of a new Cold War between the United States and Russia, a key player in that conflict has spoken out today against "US imperialism". Although Mikhail Gorbachev did not go as far as depicting current relations as another East-West standoff, in a Radio 4 interview, he accuses the US of "empire building" and undermining trust between the two, highlighting Iraq and Missile Defense as major sources of tension. Just as key figures in Reagan era Cold War policy re-emerged in Bush's first term, Gorbachev still holds sway in the foreign policy arena. Gorbachev could never be described as a peace envoy for Putin, but his comments represent an attempt by Russian figures past and present to defend Russia's case - expect a major PR offensive at this week's G8 meeting. Despite his usual optimism, Gorbachev paints a gloomy picture about the future. Diplomatic relations have certainly detiorated recently, in particular with Britain over the Litvinenko investigation. An arms race is on the horizon - Putin has stated that Russia will match US missile defence systems in Eastern Europe by directing its own missiles at European targets. The US response is that their intentions have been transparent with regular briefings, but Russia has preferred "unhelpful rhetoric over actual collaboration". Russia has also sought to extend its influence over former Soviet satellites, in disputes with Georgia over gas, plus Estonia over statues of Soviet war dead and cyberterrorism.

This decline in relations lies more within Russia and its internal failings than in a mutual polarisation between East and West. The slow modernisation process in Russia, rampant corruption and political or economic inequality, have fed a bitter isolationist attitude that Putin encapsulates. Russia has had some very bad PR of late, whether over gay protests, former KGB spies or murdered journalists, but this hardly represents pariah status. It is not a solid excuse for lack of progress, but Russia did exist in what seems a very alien ideological system compared to today for nearly 70 years, up until 1991. As for Putin, he is set to stand down next year, so either, like Blair, he is looking for a legacy but the more radical version or he is setting out the conditions whereby his successor can continue to assert an aggressive Russian foreign policy.

Tripoli - Palestinians forgotten northern refuge

2007-05-20T22:11:00.000Z

Lebanon's second largest city Tripoli has been the focus of an unexpected escalation of factional clashes in the last few days. In the worst violence since the end of the 1976-1990 civil war, Lebanon's army have fought radical Palestinian off-shoot Fatah Al-Islam. In the Nahr al-Bared refugee camp north of Tripoli, the militant group with supposed ties to Al-Qaeda in Iraq and Syrian intelligence amongst others, has opened new fissures in Lebanon's multi-confessional matrix. Tripoli is one of the most northerly fringes of the Palestinian diaspora, and has particular resonance for Lebanese Palestinians. PLO leader Yasser Arafat withstood an Israeli onslaught during the siege of Tripoli in December 1983 before an exodus to Tunis, enhancing his legendary status amongst the Palestinian people. Arafat would survive and Israel's primary objective to eradicate the PLO had failed, although their presence ended in Lebanon. PLO-Fatah absence from the occupied territories allowed Islamists to flourish - Hamas played a key role in the 1987 intifada - creating the factional conflict now seen in Gaza.

Although we should be careful about viewing 1980s Palestinian resistance through rose tinted shades. There is a contrast to the radicalism of today that selfishly hinders their nation's progress, with the more noble resistance of Fatah - although they were accurately described as terrorists at the time. Hamas are creating problems but their popular mandate is thin, only 44% of voters chose them in the 2006 election with turn out under a quarter of the total Palestinian population. And now in 2007, as rockets fire at Sderot, splinter groups battle in the north and Hezbollah wait and re-arm, another summer of war seems highly probable once again.

Read on here in this excellent article: http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-debate_97/report_gaza_4632.jsp

Algeria - the long road to democracy

2007-05-17T06:26:00.000Z

Fifteen years after the military junta cancelled the democratic process paving the way for a brutal civil war, voters return to the polls today for the latest step in Algeria's torturous democratic process. Although parliamentary and presidential elections have been every few years since 1995, underlying tensions remain. Recent terrorist attacks by Al-Qaeda linked militants have added an extra edge, and despite a reconciliation process, the return to the dark days of the 1990s is not far from the minds of weary Algerians. The development of Algerian democracy is an often cited case, as it was one of the first attempts to bring popular representation to the region. The victory for the Islamist movement - FIS - and subsequent military coup show what can happen when democracy and Islam combine, and what can go wrong. As the seminal Islamist electoral success story, FIS bitterly divided Algeria. Opinion of the movement ranged from fear of the imposition an undemocratic Iranian style theocracy, to representing vital salvation after years of decline under socialist rule. The leadership symbolised the dilemma facing Algerians and international observers at the time. Abassi Madani projected a moderate image - promoting democracy as the best way of ending Algeria's economic and social decline. Ali Belhadj, his deputy, led the salafi radical wing who rejected democracy - “Democracy is a stranger in the House of God. There is no democracy in Islam” - but at the same time encouraged Algerians to use democracy to end FLN rule. These contradictions did not inspire confidence and the international community's perception of “One man, one vote, one time” - meant that there was little condemnation of the 1992 coup. A similar situation to the Hamas victory last year, but FIS had not been designated as a terrorist group, making the silence less understandable. How democratic FIS would have been in full power is debatable. The extreme level of resistance in the civil war to the military junta firstly by the AIS (Islamic Salvation Army) and then the GIA, shows how militants had the potential to dominate FIS' political agenda. The salafi wing of FIS rejected democracy as it conflicted with the Islamic concept of Tawhid, but for moderates like Madani - FIS had a nationalist and pluralist agenda that looked to create economic and social reform through democracy.

The Age of Brown

2007-05-11T21:11:00.000Z

After yesterday's long awaited farewell and the flood of era-ending analysis, we have now moved into new territory, unchartered waters, the land of Gordon, the age of Brown. He has had approximately 13 years to make this speech and you cannot doubt his intent by the following statement: "I want to build a shared national consensus for a programme of constitutional reform that strengthens the accountability of all who hold power; that is clear about the rights and responsibilities of being a citizen in Britain today; that defends the union and is vigilant about ensuring that the hard won liberties of the individual, for which Britain has for centuries been renowned round the world, are at all times upheld without relenting in our attack on terrorism." His opening gambit in Knebworth was overshadowed (literally) by a misplaced autocue screen. But maybe this was deliberate, we have had far too much presentation in the last decade and Cameron has the same obsession. The image isn't important, it is the substance and this organizational blunder has inadvertently highlighted this. The second major speech of the day included a few Nixon and Reagan jokes, maybe created a bit of early distance with Republicanism? Opinion polls on tonight's Newsnight show him a fair way behind Cameron, but having played second best to Blair for so long, and having an obviously lower media profile has meant that the electorate just don't have an informed view of him, even though he has been the country's number 2 for 10 years. There won't be a snap election so Brown has a free run for the next few years to change those views - or not.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/6646349.stm

The Hand of History

2007-05-10T23:39:00.000Z

The ten year anniversary has just past and the announcement has been made today, it is time for the hand of history to give Blair the judgement he has been waiting for. Blair has an ambiguous relationship with history: he uses it when it suits - to justify decisions; but is overtly conscious of his historical place within Labour party and British history. "Historic third term" and "legacy" have been Blairite mantras since 2005. So prepare yourself for a political cottage industry as despite our apolitical tendencies, the last ten years will be trawled over in the finest detail until you're wishing that John Major won a second term in 1997. Standby for a barrage of Blair's soundbite gems ("shoulder to shoulder"; "elected as New Labour; govern as New Labour"; "I can apologise"), endless repetitions of Oasis / D:Ream montages of 1997 euphoria and early attempts to create a political revolution, and Blair and Bush taking that pointless red carpet walk before denouncing the Left, Islamists and all the other Iraq doomsayers. Prepare to undergo a re-appraisal of your entrenched views and conclude that despite spin, failed public sector reforms, cash for honours, government resignations, ID cards, crime and Middle East policy, we could have done a lot worse. Blair for all his failings has not plumbed to Thatcher - Major dark depths and Cameron will only seem like TB2 with a quiff. Gordon's enigmatic nature gives him a clean slate to take over and I think he will represent a beautiful three year interregnum. So the Blair era has coincided with dramatic global political, social and cultural changes, which he has surfed upon and reacted to very well, but as a visionary, a revolutionary or a great leader - he hasn't come that close.

Shifting Plates

2007-05-08T20:34:00.000Z

The tectonic plates of British politics are shifting this week through immense gravitation and friction. Within the space of 7 days (a week is a long time in politics I hear you cry), the SNP achieved a parliamentary victory for the first time in their history, power sharing is finalised in Northern Ireland with old foes McGuiness and Paisley united, and Tony Blair will announce his resignation paving the way for Gordon Brown to assume the leadership. Now these developments have not arisen out of the blue and I will not analyse the historical context here, rather let's consider what this means for the future of British politics. Well - one word - regionalisation. The tide of devolution that has broken over British shores since 1999, has received its largest fillip this week. Now political structures and true devolved power are in place, economic and cultural prosperity can flourish. Well that's the idea. England, sitting in the middle of this upheaval, will in some ways be heading in an opposite direction: a Scottish leader, the ever present burden of centralised power and an identity crisis on the horizon. But the reverse might happen, multiculturalism has been England's substitute for devolution in our cultural barometer, a leader not embroiled in South East England's Middle Englishness could challenge the population in new and rewarding ways (the West Lothian question reversed and answered), and globalisation - already rampant - will continue as English identity and political influence stretches further afield. So devolution empowers, but also liberates.

Now given the predictably intractable nature of British politics, these shifts of power will probably face complications: the SNP need to play coalition politics to make anything from their victory, Paisley and McGuiness hold diametrically opposed views, Brown is facing a demoralised Labour party and Conservatives in the ascendancy pressuring for an early General Election. So the political tectonic plates are moving in a similar way to Earth's: convergent (two political plates moving towards each other - Northern Ireland), divergent (two plates moving apart - Scotland) and transform (two plates sliding horizontally past each other creating cataclysmic stresses along the way - Blair to Brown to Cameron of course!). This might be a very unscientific geography lesson, but I hope it sums up the historic events of the last week.

Democracy Update

2007-05-07T20:02:00.000Z

In 2002, the United States National Security Strategy (NSS) declared that democracy was America's mission for "every corner of the world", but first and foremost the urgent necessity was in the Middle East. The so called Bush Doctrine asserted that democracy would be a panacea for Islamic terrorism, Iraq would be the model for others to follow. Five years on and with Iraqi democracy hanging by a thread, Islamists elected in Palestine, and untransparent restricted democratic pretensions in other Arab states, what progress has been made?

Historically democracy in the Middle East is sparse. Colonial rule working in tandem with strict regressive monarchies, then one party state socialism with dubious definitions of "democratic", have smothered any progress for pluralism and popular representation. The region is split between these two strands authoritarianism: King Abdullah vs Mubarak, King Hussein vs Bashar al-Assad, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi vs Saddam Hussein. In addition to the politics and this far from democratic tradition, religion is arguably a stumbling block. Democracy and Islam are not compatible as sovereignty lies with God not man. But Islamic movements have participated in elections and adhered to democracy, albeit with reservations. Algerian Islamists achieved electoral success in 1991, Muslim Brotherhood candidates running as independents gained 20% in Egypt's 2005 elections. Here is the update:

Algeria

18 million Algerians are registered to vote in the upcoming legislative elections set for May 17

Bahrain

parliamentary elections held on 25 November 2006 with major gains for Shia and Sunni Islamist parties. The election was preceded by a political realignment in which opposition parties that had boycotted 2002's poll agreed to take part. Turnout was 72%. Salafists Al Asalah came third.

Egypt

President Hosni Mubarak has won three elections unopposed since 1981, but in 2005 for his fourth contest - under US pressure - he changed the system to allow rival candidates. Mubarak's National Democratic Party won 68%, while independents Muslim Brotherhood gained 19.4%. Concerns were expressed after the 2005 elections about government interference in the election process through fraud and vote-rigging. In addition, violence by pro-Mubarak supporters against opposition demonstrators and police brutality were evident during the elections.

TBContinued

Turkey - A Crisis on the Horizon

2007-04-30T21:13:00.000Z

Turkey that bastion of secularism in the Middle East is facing a constitutional crisis, as popular protests and the army have indicated it will oppose Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan's pro Islamist policies and his decision to put forward Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul for president. Secular politics have been central to Turkey since the establishment of the republic in 1923. Although Islam and state have been split in other Middle Eastern political orders, it has never been enshrined to the same extent as it has since Ataturk's reforms of the 1920s. Turkey's path to secularism contrasts to failed arab socialism, autocratic despotism, outright dictatorship and Islamist theocracy.

Another development - although it is unclear if it is or will be related - is US Congress' proposed resolution to officially recognise the Armenian genocide. Promoted by the not uninfluential Armenian -American lobby, Congress' move has drawn condemnation and threats from Turkish politicians. The sensitivity of the subject is a severe hindrance to Turkey's aspirations for EU membership and acceptance as a mature actor in international affairs. The Bush administration is treading carefully to avoid the G word, and as a vital regional ally politically and economically, this denial is to be expected.

The link, if any, is unclear between these two political conundrums, but I will update as it develops.

http://www.demaz.org/cgi-bin/e-cms/vis/vis.pl?s=001&p=0055&n=002467&g=
http://www.turkishweekly.net/news.php?id=44644
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Armenian_Genocide
http://www.guardian.co.uk/turkey/story/0,,2070022,00.html
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/wn_report/2007/04/29/2007-04-29_us_in_war_of_words_with_turkey.html

Who's Right?

2007-04-15T20:16:00.000Z

So am I of the left or right? Well, neither actually. The two terms have never really represented my political views, and elsewhere since the end of the cold war and even more so after the apolitical nineties, they have also lost their power to define most viewpoints. But there are swathes of opinions and activists out there who still stand proud under these respective banners, and there are others who claim no particular political perspective but for arguments sake fall into the left/right axiom. Nick Cohen's book What's Left? argues that Left/liberal/socialist/(it has many guises) thought has lost its way, ditch its principles, has been recently very wrong on certain issues, and without doubt needs reform. The core of his criticism lies in the Iraq war, and he argues that those who marched against war in February 2003 were misguidedly keeping a genocidal totalitarian dictator in power, something the left would surely be against more than anything else (historically). Post invasion, the left has put their desire to be vindicated over Iraqis desires for democracy, freedom from Bathist/Al-Qaeda terror, and successful re-construction. Beyond the Middle East, Cohen also critiques Chomsky, Said, incomprehensible academic scribblers, 1992-5 Conservative government Bosnia policy, George Galloway, Michael Moore, Virginia Woolf, WW2 Communist appeasers and others.

One chapter examines the heart of the Liberal-Left's inconsistency and weakness - the appeasement of Hitler in the 1930s. The root cause (an unfair Treaty of Versailles) was to blame; communists saw the real enemy as Churchill and his wartime Labour colleagues; the Soviet invasion of Finland (post non-aggression pact) was defended by Hobsbawm (Birkbeck's current president) amongst others. Cohen is exceptional in drawing solid comparisons between the war years and now, and also provides an enjoyable historical narrative to this troubling episode.

Now Nick Cohen is of the Left, is a consistent critic of Tony Blair, and unlike other Left-Right trangressives (Hitchens/Aaronovitch) presents his arguments in more reasoned terms than the usual descent into self-righteousness that this argument normally succombs to. And as reading this book, I found his arguments very convincing. Why should a totalitarian and homicidal regime be left in power, why do the SWP or others care little of who their Islamist allies are (and their bigoted right wing views), why do people care more about whether something was illegal under such and such international law or whether intelligence was caveated or not - when innocent civilians are being blown to pieces on a daily basis. Try this. Next time you listen to a debate on Iraq (if you don't turn off), listen out for the number of times that the blame for the violence is laid directly (where 90% of it is) at Bathists, Al-Qaeda, Sadrists and every other criminal roaming the land. Being right is more important than an innocent civilians life. Sadly after a while I've realised that the left have been deceptive as the right on this whole catastrophe. And as with other examples in the book, neither side has a monopoly on integrity.

Cohen's arguments do not convincingly counter the pacifist view that opposes all violence, nor do they incorporate the overwhelming view that Bush, Rumsfeld, etc inspired no faith in a nation building or democratic ethos prior, and rather that it seemed purely driven by vendetta. And Tony was jumping on the bandwagon. Hindsight has proven some of those arguments right and wrong, but at the time it was hard to trust such intentions. Islamism poses a far greater threat to the west than Bathism ever did, see also Sam Harris, but the overwhelming irony is that we have forced two enemies to unite. These arguments can and will continue. As I have never been of either left/right slant, this book was enjoyable and enlightening, so I am now going find someone who is one or the other (preferably left) and see if it has the same effect. Sadly I am not optimistic.

http://www.amazon.co.uk/End-Faith-Religion-Terror-Future/dp/0743268091/ref=sr_1_2/203-8393331-7887958?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1176671475&sr=1-2

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euston_manifesto

http://www.prospect.org/print/V12/18/berman-p.html

http://www.iraqmemory.org/EN/index.asp

http://www.prospect-magazine.co.uk/article_details.php?id=8339

Quixotic Futuristic

2007-04-09T13:27:00.000Z

To understand the future, we must understand the past, as the saying goes. And now we can understand the present, by understanding the future. A 90-page report published by the Ministry of Defence, with the aim of understanding the "future strategic context" facing Britain's armed forces, shows where we are in the immediate now. Some highlights:

New weapons

An electromagnetic pulse will probably become operational by 2035 able to destroy all communications systems in a selected area or be used against a "world city" such as an international business service hub. The development of neutron weapons which destroy living organs but not buildings "might make a weapon of choice for extreme ethnic cleansing in an increasingly populated world". The use of unmanned weapons platforms would enable the "application of lethal force without human intervention, raising consequential legal and ethical issues". The "explicit use" of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear weapons and devices delivered by unmanned vehicles or missiles.

Marxism

"The middle classes could become a revolutionary class, taking the role envisaged for the proletariat by Marx," says the report. The thesis is based on a growing gap between the middle classes and the super-rich on one hand and an urban under-class threatening social order: "The world's middle classes might unite, using access to knowledge, resources and skills to shape transnational processes in their own class interest". Marxism could also be revived, it says, because of global inequality. An increased trend towards moral relativism and pragmatic values will encourage people to seek the "sanctuary provided by more rigid belief systems, including religious orthodoxy and doctrinaire political ideologies, such as popularism and Marxism".

The Middle East

The massive population growth will mean the Middle East, and to a lesser extent north Africa, will remain highly unstable, says the report. It singles out Saudi Arabia, the most lucrative market for British arms, with unemployment levels of 20% and a "youth bulge" in a state whose population has risen from 7 million to 27 million since 1980. "The expectations of growing numbers of young people [in the whole region] many of whom will be confronted by the prospect of endemic unemployment ... are unlikely to be met," says the report.

Islamic militancy

Resentment among young people in the face of unrepresentative regimes "will find outlets in political militancy, including radical political Islam whose concept of Umma, the global Islamic community, and resistance to capitalism may lie uneasily in an international system based on nation-states and global market forces", the report warns. The effects of such resentment will be expressed through the migration of youth populations and global communications, encouraging contacts between diaspora communities and their countries of origin. Tension between the Islamic world and the west will remain, and may increasingly be targeted at China "whose new-found materialism, economic vibrancy, and institutionalised atheism, will be an anathema to orthodox Islam".

Iran

Iran will steadily grow in economic and demographic strength and its energy reserves and geographic location will give it substantial strategic leverage. However, its government could be transformed. "From the middle of the period," says the report, "the country, especially its high proportion of younger people, will want to benefit from increased access to globalisation and diversity, and it may be that Iran progressively, but unevenly, transforms...into a vibrant democracy."

Terrorism

Casualties and the amount of damage inflicted by terrorism will stay low compared to other forms of coercion and conflict. But acts of extreme violence, supported by elements within Islamist states, with media exploitation to maximise the impact of the "theatre of violence" will persist. A "terrorist coalition" including a wide range of reactionary and revolutionary rejectionists such as ultra-nationalists, religious groupings and even extreme environmentalists, might conduct a global campaign of greater intensity".

http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/story/0,,2053020,00.html

Kristatos and the monks

2007-03-28T17:01:00.000Z

It might seem like an inpenetrable fortress in the film, requiring super-human climbing skills from a septegenarian Roger Moore, but the ascent is fairly moderate. Agia Triada is one of six monasteries in the Meteora range in north west Greece, base for villain Kristatos in Bond film For Your Eyes Only, but more importantly the spiritual home to monks since the 11th century. Rather than relying on shoe laces or using Q's latest gadget, it required a 30 minute climb via a path carved into the side. Another monastery is the Varlaam, founded in the 16th century, by an anchorite monk, where you can buy incense, CDs of Byzantine music, and a short book "what is orthodoxy?". The Meteora region is stunning, no doubt: a range of rock pillars that dominate like giant granite collossus on the edge of the Hellenic plain. At dusk, monastery bells sound off in sequence, humbling the inhabitants of the town below. The monks themselves were naturally elusive. The largest of the monasterys - Megalo Meteoro - is a complex of living quarters, kitchen, refectory (where preserved plates, goblets, candlesticks are on display). This monastery has a larger museum than the others, with wider Greek history, in particular military atire and paintings from the Balkans wars (1912-13) and the campaign against the Axis (1940-41). A Nazi soldier is seen falling down from a pillar, these monoliths were totally impregnable once. The museum also holds Byzantine scripts of early philosophers: Plato, Aristotle. To round it all off, the in house ossuary holds nearly 100 human skulls.

http://www.greecetravel.com/meteora/monasteries.html

The birth of democracy?

2007-03-26T18:32:00.000Z

So to truly maintain the historic side of this blog, I have travelled to the birthplace of modern intellectual thought, where advances in science, democracy and philosophy put down markers for the whole of western civilization. Pretty impressive eh? Well I will fail to encapsulate the whole magnitude of Athens' history, partly due to my limited time here - partly due its lengthy importance to Greek, Roman and Byzantine empires that spanned 2,000 years. The Parthenon, built in the 5th century, towers over the city, as a flag bearer for democracy - Athenian democracy. Considering western Europe has had this source of democracy for 2,500 years, we should be hasty when analysing other parts of the world who have experienced it for a mere 25 years. Like modern day democracy, the Greek model was not flawless. Whether this implies that it is a fallible ideology like any other or that it requires maturity is an interesting question. Fukuyama may have it as the final answer, but man's corruption will corrupt any ideology no matter how perfect it is. I will be visiting the Parthenon tomorrow and I will tell you whether democracy is an ideology for all history or one of purely temporary and modern success....well, Athens like democracy is a bit of an evolving building site. Thankfully they completed their 2004 Olympics schedule on queue (London 2012 take note) but sound of construction is quite prevalent. None less than at the top of the Acropolis, although it is only re-construction, the works there show that supposed perfection will be damaged, deliberated over and rebuilt. Democracy needs re-construction they say. So towering over Athens, surrounded by the white roofed pastures, the Parthenon tries to rise above modernity but is also reliant on it for preservation.

Trident - the reckoning

2007-03-14T23:44:00.000Z

So the inevitable renewal of the Trident missile system - supported 409 MPs to 248 by the House of Commons - has updated Britain's nuclear deterrent, protecting us from 21st century threats, investing billions and giving no reason for any rogue state to suspend their nuclear programmes. On the face of it and with strong arguments, renewal makes sense: Britain is a potential target for any nuclear nut, we live in uncertain times, proliferation exists in many respects unchecked, and our status internationally depends on it. Britain is not a demoralised South Africa of the late 1980s or a coerced Libya of 4 years ago; we are Great Britain, former colonial overlords / the United States right hand man / a watchtower for global governance. Most states would consider Britain a naive laughing stock if it gave up something oh so powerful. Renewal was never going to be unrenewed, but at same time renewal or non-renewal isn't really the issue.

Historians will probably pinpoint about 2 or 3 years post Soviet collapse as a point where something approaching unilateral nuclear disarmament was possible. That window is long gone, French tests in the mid 1990s; Pakistan - India nuclear brinkmanship; North Korea's status seeking detonation; the list will continue. Pandora's box, doomsday countdown, armageddon: destruction has plenty of spiritual evocativeness - peace is a quaint lost snapshot of wishful thinking.

Besides this doom, the politics is also cagey: Blair relies on Cameron; Brown will rely on Cameron; Campbell relies / will rely on the Labour backbenchers. The electorate will rely on whoever has the finger on the button to not do the wrong thing. Blair has another tick on his legacy card. Any angle make this situation seem worse.
For the record, I oppose all nuclear weapons and any means, intention or capability associated with them. But I sadly admit that this is something that is going to be lived with and coped with rather than diminished. I am looking for some solutions, any suggestions welcome. As if this isn't bad enough, an even greater crisis has just erupted - Blue Peter admits that it lied to its viewers over the result of a phone-in competition. If the bastion of youth TV educationalism cannot be trusted then what future does mankind have?

Forgotten soldiers in a forgotten war

2007-02-24T21:35:00.000Z

Although the Korean war (1950-53) has the unofficial title of the "Forgotten War", the Iran-Iraq war of the 1980s is probably ranked second, both in misunderstanding its context and its horrific side effects. World attention focused on Iraq's invasion of Kuwait two years after its ceasefire, condemning it to a hidden history where few remember who started it or how many died, and some don't even know the difference between the two protagonists (sharing the same first three letters is confusing I know). But it was a war that created conditions for the current Middle East conflict, both in terms of US involvement in the region and Sunni-Shia strife.

Nearly one million Iranians and Iraqis died over the period, but beneath these numbers few stories have been revealed. A series of films at the Barbican depict fictitiously and by documentary some of the stories. In Living in the Clouds, the lives of a group of Iranian soldiers in the Iraqi Kurdistan mountains are caught in painstaking detail. In a desolate region, soldiers boil down snow, re-construct shelters, call patiently for supplies, but apart from the odd gunshot seem distant from any conflict or any political authority. A soldier politely contacts his base for fuel, simply concerned with survival in a remote outpost. The enemy is mentioned, but is almost second priority to self preservation. True, for many soldiers on the frontline, death was only an instant away, but for every battlefield casualty there is a casualty elsewhere. Extreme cold is exchanged for Iraqi tanks. Either way is pointless. In Captive Waiting, Iraqi prisoners of war wait for their freedom. The final release was not until the eve of the 2nd Gulf war. POWs normally expect a release some time close to a war's conclusion, but 15 years on only adds to the bitterness. This is worsened by false dawns when Iraq fails to bring Iranian POWs in exchange. Not only are these soldiers imprisoned for crimes not committed but when the rest of the world can move on, they are trapped in this historic limbo.

Rendition - the silent partners

2007-02-19T19:01:00.000Z

Whilst the Bush administration have pursued policies that test international standards of human rights and re-write international law in their fight against militant Islam; European nations have been considered as a rational counterweight, maintaining international norms and responsibilities. Well, until last week's European Parliament report, which accused several EU states of turning a blind eye and admitting flights operated by the CIA for illegal transportation of detainees. The key element of extraordinary rendition is transportation, and for the policy to work it needs other countries to act as end states where interrogation (and often torture) takes place, but also, given geographical distances, as transit states where refueling, recuperation or anything else required can take place. Just as the supply chain from drug producers to drug dealers cannot operate without innocuous middle men, rendition requires willing accomplices. Also, as the states most likely to undertake rigorous interrogations are in the Middle East or North Africa rather than closer Latin America, a leisurely stopover, or to use the correct terminology "layover", in European city makes perfect sense.

European states that could be generally considered liberal with solid human rights records have been implicated, including Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Of these Sweden, prone to Scandinavian passivity in foreign affairs, has also been ruled against by the UN for violating a global torture ban. The EU report also names Poland and Romania - who are both accused of deeper involvement in the process and hosting secret CIA prisons.

The standard governmental response is that these flights are either legal or that they do not exist. Rendition has still not caught public attention as other WOT contraversies, but the use of European sites for an American anti Al-Qaeda Gulag touches a nerve. Whilst America claims to be a legislatively precise society; Europe considers itself legislatively wiser. And the backlash has begun. Germany have issued warrants for CIA officers involved in rendition, and Italy (that staunch ally circa 2003) has ordered 26 CIA agents to stand trial for the kidnapping of an Italian citizen. Whilst justice systems tend to act autonomously of government; with a political issue as contentious as rendition, it is hard not to see a link. Sadly it is the courts pushing the politicians into action, not vice versa. A solid campaign by NGOs over the last 3 years has added the moral structure to the debate. Despite this opening, a secret war remains out there, virtually untouchable by the courts, media or human rights organisations. The release of Guatanamo pictures in January 2002 was a smokescreen in this regard, shocking us, but distracting from the larger picture.

So in the dock: the CIA; Bush administration policy and complicit governments in Europe and elsewhere. The response. Well, the response is denial, since any admission or justification simply would not stand up. Rendition has been used for over a century, but this enhanced and extreme version - extraordinary rendition - is on very thin ice legally, according to investigative reporter Stephen Grey. The author of the groundbreaking book Ghost Plane interviewed several CIA officers who disapproved of the policy, but were aware of the reality of its benefits in a dirty war. Speaking at SOAS this evening, Grey also explained that European complicity was borne out of the need for counterterrorist intelligence and concern at being out of the loop on possible threats, plots, etc. As for Middle Eastern states, where the suspects are usually tortured, there is the benefit of added intel on internal threats; hard cash ($10m is the going rate per suspect); and diplomatic credibility (although not fully received in Syria's case).

It was vice president Cheney, who said shortly after 9/11 that this would be a dirty war, although a man of few words, there is resonance to most of those he utters. Plots will be interrupted, but intelligence gained under duress is often flawed. Ask Ibn Sheikh al-Libi, who fed false information to CIA interrogators that was included in the US' case against Iraq. The CIA has a history of flawed programmes to gain intelligence, please watch these pages for a fortcoming essay. As for rendition, this issue isn't going away and it's only going to implicate governments further.

http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0804522/

http://web.amnesty.org/pages/stoptorture-050406-feature-eng

What happened to the French?

2007-02-04T18:54:00.000Z

As arguably the weakest member of the UN security council and having experienced a slow decline in world status since the 1950s, France has rightly developed an inferiority complex. Ever since the 1962 defeat in the Algerian War of Independence and the painful decolonisation process, France has sought to re-capture its lost historical eminence. Its international status was boosted as it carved a globally popular position against the US-UK alliance in 2003 before the Iraq war. On top of this, France retains it position on the security council often acting as a balance between Atlantic powers and Asian; is at the heart of the European Union; often contributes to peace-keeping or NATO operations whether in the Balkans or Lebanon; yet its influence and world position is still fragile.

This week's retraction by Jacques Chirac over comments about the possible threat from a nuclear armed Iran, may be the side-effect of a leader nearing the end of his tenure. But combined with his potential predecessors lack of foreign policy adeptness, seen by Socialist presidential candidate Segolene Royal's recent gaffes and centre-right rival Nicolas Sarkozy's tentative forays into the foreign policy arena when visiting Britain last month, reinforces the impression that France is struggling to find itself internationally, once again.

France's recent internal problems have shifted the focus of political debate overwhelmingly to the domestic. The last two years have seen the worse civil unrest since the 1968 student riots exposing deep social racism; unpopular labour legislation resulting in more protests; economic stagnation and an unprecedented identity crisis. The final insult being uncovered documents revealing that in the 1950s, Britain and France discussed the possibility of uniting with Queen Elizabeth II as France's head of state. With such insecurities, connected with the rest of world with coherent policy isn't easy.

But historically, and despite the acrimony prior to the invasion of Iraq, France has a role. Last summer's war in Lebanon led to France taking a primary diplomatic role and providing peacekeeping troops. France's historical ties to Lebanon during the 23 year mandate period, and Britain's discredited Middle East position, created an opportunity to mediate. France's demographic structure gives it a diplomatic advantage with the largest Arab and Jewish populations in western Europe. So in April this year, France will elect a new president and maybe a renewed foreign policy. Britain will also have a new leader by the summer, so a shift in European foreign policy as a whole could be upon us.

Algeria - an unfinished war

2007-01-28T21:34:00.000Z

After a new front opened in the Horn of Africa earlier this year, and completing another little jihadist historical cycle, Algeria's militant GSPC group have adopted brand bin laden, changing their name to the al-Qaeda organisation in the Islamic Maghreb. A signed statement posted on the internet confirms fears that Al-Qaeda's influence is slowly spreading across North Africa, and that Algeria's civil war of the 1990s is not quite finished. How serious are either of these developments? The brand has been widely adopted by various jihadist groups of varying capability, but this does not necessarily imply an operational partnership. Know-how is widely available via the internet and thousands of Islamists in Algeria's civil war gained vital experience during the Afghanistan war against the Soviets. So the expertise and potential is there. But, a direct line between Pakistan's North West frontier and the Maghreb is probably pushing it.

More likely is that this represents another legacy of one of most brutal and forgotten wars of the late 20th century. Up to 200,000 Algerians died in this near ten year conflict, between Islamist and government forces, that erupted after the 1991 the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) election victory was cancelled. Within the context of Islamic political history, this was a seismic event. The compatability of Islam and democracy can be debated, but the war certainly shows Islamism's determination to gain power rather than adhering to democratic principles, the lengths authoritarian regimes will go to block it, and in the context of the 1990s - the ever increasing proliferation of militant Islam.

The FIS initially held a moderate leadership, and after their disbandment in March 1992, retreated to northern Algeria's mountains to conduct a guerrilla war. The resistance split into competing factions with different tactics, military/government targets or civilian. The violence evolved into an internecine conflict as hardline Islamist group the GIA (Armed Islamic Group), waged a brutal campaign against the government; previous allies FIS, who were considered collaborators; and thousands of civilians. Both the FIS and GIA sought an Islamic state, through democratic or violent means, but neither succeeded. Atrocities reached their peak in 1997. The GIA proved too extreme for most Islamists, and former members created the GSPC - which although not quite as extreme is constantly active.

Algeria fits neatly between Afghanistan and Iraq in the militant Islam chronology. Factionalism, fanatical commitment to overthrowing the state, and use of extreme violence are the common factors. A low level war is ongoing, but given that GSPC is numbering about 300 fighters, it is a low priority. Algeria's war is hopefully finished, and considering WMD trends across the region - Algeria and Jordan are looking to initiate nuclear programs - having one more state becoming unstable could have devastating consequences.

Big Brother: The end of an Empire

2007-01-21T14:14:00.000Z

This blog looks at current events from a historico-political angle with a degree of high brow prose, so I am not dumbing down in any respect in this next post, but this concerns the latest media fed social-cultural experiment on wayward modern British attitudes in a very bizarre house. Aka (it's difficult to type this): celebrity Big Brother. I am not remotely interested in who is a racist, what it says about the British working classes or whether Channel 4 should be scrapped. The important issue is Britain and its history with India past, present and future. If Jade et al had victimised someone of another race, then the impact I think (this is controversial) would not have been as acute. Firstly they probably wouldn't have, but Indian culture despite integrating fully into British society, is misunderstood, patronised and, in the case of the witches of Elstree, feared. The relationship between the two has not overcome its mixed history and sadly it has taken a bit of TV as crass as this to show it. The Raj, the Jewel in the Crown, represented the best and worst of the British Empire. Between 1858 and 1947, Britain governed India and traded off its wealth, the success of which is remarkable given how diametrically opposed the two cultures are. Post World War II, the inevitable partition left an ugly stain, as it did in all former colonies. However the Commonwealth Immigrants Act 1962 might be considered a turning point for British history - creating the conditions for a multi-cultural Britain. Given that this process began 45 years ago, attitudes like those on display are startling (to most liberal semi intellectual people), but where there is ignorance there is prejudice. The fortunes of both countries have been mixed since we parted 60 years ago this year. India took a long road to possible global domination (economically at least); Britain has taken a long road to global subservience (politically at least). Gordon Brown, caught in a storm of protests during his visit to India, puts the subcontinent as a key player in this century. And these events have probably done his political future a good turn, raising his profile and vision indirectly. Brown praises India and calls for a new world order, but thankfully Jade etc won't be part of it.

Who were the Safavids?

2007-01-16T23:45:00.000Z

In another blow to Sunni-Shia reconciliation, yesterday's gruesome execution of former Ba'thist judge Barzan Ibrahim al-Tikriti, was described with historical resonance as "the grudge of the Safavids" by his son-in-law. A misjudgment in the length of rope required to hang Saddam Hussein's half brother led to his decapitation, a scene thankfully not released by the Iraqi government to date. From the Yemen, Azzam Salih Abdullah, claimed that the beheading was an act of revenge by the newly empowered Shia leaders. Reference to the Safavids is significant, as it was this Iranian dynasty that established Shia Islam in Persia, creating the first Shi'a state. Originally from Iranian Azarbaijan, the Safavids built an empire between 1501 and 1736 that stretched eastwards to Kandahar, and bordered the Ottoman Empire along the Euphrates. Baghdad was sacked as part of an early campaign, and constant invasion by both the Safavids and Ottomans led to the city's decline until the 20th century. History in the Middle East enjoys cycles and the peoples feed on it and cherish it. History pays back them in return, and often with added tragedy.

The new Saddam..

2007-01-16T10:14:00.000Z

2006 was a good year for ridding the world of the 20th century's worst dictators. In March Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic died in his cell in the Hague; Chile's General Augusto Pinochet departed after heart failure in December; the extremely eccentric President Niyazov of Turkmenistan passed before Christmas and Saddam Hussein was executed 2 days before the year's end. So far in 2007, Fidel Castro is on his death bed according to latest reports. The term dictator might now slowly become a thing of the past, reserved simply for politics students and the historian establishment. Globalisation, the spread of liberal democracy, and global appeals for equality in human rights have been chipping away at despotic principles the world over. Slowly peoples resist and dictators are exposed for what they really are. So who is left? The majority based around Africa, Middle East and South Asia and new additions do pop up occasionally (Thailand being a latest). http://www.arthuredelstein.org/worlddictators/
You would need to ask the peoples involved, but I would struggle to believe that all of these are in the Saddam, Milosevic category. Swaziland and Oman are, as far as I know, peaceful places where democracy isn't a priority but repression isn't the done thing either. But old favorites Mugabe, Kim Jong il, etc obviously fit into the classic definition. However the counter argument says that the international system is not advanced enough for a tyranny free world. Imbalances of power from poverty, post-colonialism or militarism prolong an international dictatorial presence.
Dictators often use history as an inspiration; Stalin's cult of personality inspired Saddam and Jong-il; and Saddam in turn provides a model for Burma's General Than Shwe. So whilst these ambitions to be added to the pantheon of meglomaniacs continue to exist and motivate in the Third world, dictators are going to be with us a little while longer.

Black Hawk Down: the sequel

2007-01-09T21:42:00.000Z

Just when all the attention is on Iraq and the Bush administration's new strategy, US airstrikes have hit suspected Al-Qaeda targets in Somalia. The Horn of Africa has been simmering since the infamous Black Hawk Down disaster of October 1993, with no satisfactory political resolution, an ever increasing Islamist presence, and the recent conflict with Ethiopia. How connected the Islamists in Somalia are to those in Iraq is unclear. But if Sudanese fighters can be arrested in Baghdad, then why not Somalians? With both African states (Sudan and Somalia) experiencing greater penetration by Al-Qaeda related groups and exporting / importing similar ideologies, the region has become a little bit smaller (and dangerous). When you consider how close Somalia is to Saudi Arabia, maybe a new front might be opening in the war against Al-Qaeda. A short boat journey and the jihadist circle is squared once again.

But this might simply be unfinished business. The scars of Mogadishu 1993, Al-Qaeda's first significant attack against Kenya and Tanzanian embassies in 1998, are still there, despite being on Clinton's watch. For all the talk of preventive strikes in the wake of the Bush doctrine, only 1 similar attack has occured in the Yemen 2002. So given the low priority of these suspects, I would suspect that wider geopolitical goals are under consideration here. A new conflict could be emerging and the US wants to get an early blow in.

Bulgaria nEUw year...

2007-01-04T19:55:00.000Z

Well I've just spent the last week in Bulgaria, eating casseroled rabbit; drinking local grappa and sharing entry into the EU. Bulgaria, no differently to any other Balkan state, has a very mixed past: wars, foreign occupation, political assassinations and ethnic tensions. Pretty average for the region, but Bulgaria has emerged smiling. With a population of 7 million and roughly the size of Liberia or Iceland, it's never going to change the world, but it has carved its own image as the responsible Balkan. No mean feat given, the region's history.

Entry to the EU may be considered a poisoned chalice to the sceptics, but it will ease investment restrictions, develop further its infrastructure (Bulgaria isn't short of building sites - most of which are idly waiting for that extra bit of cash to be injected). It also benefits the EU, in its eastern expansion (the Black Sea has been touched at last - Turkey further bordered) and circles its neighbours allowing a good view of EU offerings, making ascension more irresistable.

But Bulgaria has a long way to go. Whilst the metropolitan generation is upwardly mobile and reaching out to Western Europe, its political class are treated with cynicism and its rural classes isolated and uninterested. However the contrast to 17 years ago and also to the economic crises of the 1990s is uplifting to most Bulgarians. Whereas Czech and Hungarian entrance to the EU mainstream was swift, Bulgaria has been slow but it is better for it. Bulgaria has lived under two of history's greatest empires - Ottoman and Soviet - only to feel at home once again under another dominant structure.

Saddam - never forgotten...

2007-01-04T18:28:00.000Z

Just got back from Bulgaria, so a little late on the biggest news story of the year - damm!

In the same way, that he tormented Iraq during his rule; baffled and mocked in his trial; and divided and embarrassed in his execution, Saddam has once again left an indelible mark on Iraqi society's psyche. Given the events of the last 3 1/2 years, who could expect a humane civilised end? The brutality that cuts across all things Iraqi was here in abundance. The execution reflected all that is bad there: cold violence; sectarian vengeance; chaotic disorganisation.

But Saddam cared little for his victims, so why should he receive any favours? One fundamental rule that has always been missing, whether at Abu Ghraib, in distribution of reconstruction contracts, or suppression of the insurgency, is a sense of moral altitude. Act like we as civilised nations expect to; not accept any method to achieve our aims. American society isn't too blame by any means, but gung ho military culture; marriage to corporate interests; "liberal" use of the death penalty; and ambiguous definition of human rights in Bush administration has all fed into this ugly disaster.

Iraq has moved on now. The insurgency that Saddam played a minor role in forming has outlived him and outgrown him as a threat to both the country and the region. Thousands died during his time, but were there executions, death squads, suicide bombers? He invaded two neighbouring countries, fired scuds at a third and threatened others, but WMD proliferation was contained, terrorism limited to domestic targets, and Shia-Sunni rivalry only seen along the Iraq-Iran border. Once Saddam was arrested and on trial, he appeared weak and lacked any menace, especially as new fears emerged, but to both his supporters and enemies he will never be forgotten.

How bad are the Saudis?

2006-12-18T17:03:00.000Z

Last week's decision to suspend an investigation by the Serious Fraud Office (SFO) into corruption between Saudi Arabia and BAE systems during one of the largest defence deals in UK history, raises old concerns about who our allies are and what we are prepared to indulge of them. The deal was undoubtedly beneficial to the UK in economic terms; Saudi Arabia is a key ally against international terrorism, especially when sharing intelligence; and of course there is the oil. But against these obvious positives in the relationship, we have allied with an undemocratic state with a poor human rights record, who wrongfully torture British citizens and plays host to Wahhibist extremism exported to Iraq, previously to Afghanistan and for a certain15 individuals to New York. With friends like these, who needs enemies - is the cry. In the world of realpolitik, yes this relationship is acceptable, in the same way that the UK and US have supported authoritarian regimes in the past. But remember those Bush words about states that harbour terrorism. Well the Saudis funded and recognised the Taliban, previously funded mujahedin that would form Al-Qaida, preside over a collection of charities that fund Hamas, so without going in to Michael Moore territory, this is all a bit dubious.

Regardless of their questionable actions and obvious excesses, what does the future hold and can the Saudis reform or will they implode. Parallels with the Shah and Iran exist, but the ruling family retain popularity and critically wealth. Poverty and unemployment are low, but any revolution won't be for another 40 years or at least while the oil revenues keep coming.

But the main point that Britain should consider is the human rights question. Human Rights Watch's analysis: "Saudi law does not protect many basic rights. The government does not allow political parties, and places strict limits on freedom of expression. Arbitrary detention, mistreatment and torture of detainees, restrictions on freedom of movement, and lack of official accountability remain serious concerns." This description would not be out of place for a Third world dictatorship, rather than a vital economic influence. But when Britain is prepared to be accused of double standards over economic and strategic interests, a spiral of antipathy will only continue. 15 of the 18 hijackers were Saudis for this reason.

The Clinton doctrine?

2006-12-11T22:26:00.000Z

There was such a thing? Well any one leading a superpower in a turbulent period that was the 1990s, would have created some sort of foreign policy. His detractors believe that no doctrine existed.

To say that a Clinton doctrine was absent over the period 1993-2001 is not fully correct. From inauspicious beginnings, a range of foreign policy doctrines emerged but they often lacked coherence, or were flawed in their implementation. Three strands of foreign policy doctrine developed, directly influenced by the condition of the international system: enlargement; interventionism; containment of rogue states. However Clinton’s personal failings, plus difficulties within his administration; domestic factors and the practical implementation of these doctrines led to an often incoherent and ineffective foreign policy.

Clinton’s administration, elected three years after the end of the Cold War, was born in an international system described as unipolar and also uni-multipolar – one superpower and several major powers. The United States was pre eminent in this new era, in terms of economic, military, diplomatic, ideological, technological and cultural power. Major regional powers below held limited pre eminence but lacked the US global reach. Below this, lay secondary regional powers. A similar interpretation shows the United States, at the top level, as unipolar militarily; multipolar at an economic level; but below this, power is dispersed across borders and outside control of governments. Regional and ethnic conflicts could be included in this bottom level. Conflicts that had been simmering in the Cold war but fitted in rigid alliance structures had greater potential to develop under these new conditions. Lines in conflicts would be drawn between civilizations with threats from the Middle East and West Asia. The period also saw further globalisation and interdependence between states; the rise of non-state actors; transnational actors (multinational corporations, NGOs) and international actors (United Nations, World Trade Organisation, European Union).

Despite historic events – the collapse of communism and the Gulf War – taking place in the previous three years, the 1992 US election focused on economic issues. Foreign policy was an element of Clinton’s campaign and in televised debates he exhibited a tough stance on Bosnia and China, but domestic policy was his priority. Faced with inherited and emerging international issues but with no desire for active foreign policy, the Clinton administration was hesitant in adopting a strategy.

This is an abstract from my first essay of the year.

Pinochet - another dictator escapes justice

2006-12-10T22:33:00.000Z

With the exception of his dedicated hardline supporters and Margaret Thatcher, the world will shed no tears at the death of General Augusto Pinochet today, aged 91. His death could be the second of three this year for notorious dictators: Milosevic died in March; Saddam is due to be executed before the year is out. But none of them are perceived to have received the justice they deserved or has at the least received a reciprocal of the injustice they gave out. Sadly all three had the foresight to cover their murderous tracks and make future criminal proceedings difficult and controversial. Secondly the international justice system has not developed sufficiently to prosecute dictators and war criminals with efficiency. The protracted Milosevic war crimes indictment and deeply flawed Saddam trial showed the difficulties in either form of justice.

Pinochet is the last client state leader of the Cold war to pass, on the US side at least. Castro and Kim Jong-il remain for the Soviets. The General who came to power on the other September 11th, in 1973, represented all that was bad under Nixon-Kissinger foreign policy. Project FUBELT, the codename for the CIA operations, against Allende's democratically elected government, created an environment for him to seize power and torture at will. Kissinger's motivation for sanctioning this action is beyond patronizing: "I don't see why we need to stand by and watch a country go communist due to the irresponsibility of its own people. The issues are much too important for the Chilean voters to be left to decide for themselves."

What lessons can be drawn? Well, it was the same policy in 1973, that extended to Iran and the Shah, was also seen elsewhere in Latin America and also Indonesia and Saudi Arabia. That is, support for geo-politically strategic allies over human rights considerations. Despite the positive influence of the United States in ending the cold war, the side effect can be seen in anti-Americanism that developed after. Latin America has rejected American values in recent times, but on a political-economic level. However support for dubious leaderships in the Middle East during the Cold war has led to the current well of antipathy seen there today.

Litvinenko - local hero

2006-11-25T22:08:00.000Z

Orginally broken by the Sunday Times 2 weeks ago, initially thought to be poisoned by toxic chemical thallium, then not, tabloid photos follow (with crass headlines), radiation poisoning due to unknown capsules develops, then his sad death on Thursday evening, with stinging accusations and state sponsored assassination seen as a highly probable cause of Alexander Litvinenko. All along there have been denials from the Kremlin, titbits of information from acquaintances of the Russian dissident, and British government trying to keep as much distance as possible. Truth is stranger and sharper than fiction, for all involved.

So who did it? No other question seems to matter at the moment. The main culprits proposed so far have been Putin, Chechens, former FSB colleagues, fellow dissidents and suicide. Given his obvious contacts with various underworld and intelligence figures, I believe that it could be none of these and is in fact an unknown individual that he had dealings with, under very covert circumstances.

If this had been a conventional murder, it would be mid level news, but murder by radiation is totally unprecendented ... anywhere. Polonium-210 as a radioactive substance is not easily obtainable. On the wider international relations question, where is Russia heading: assassinations of critics, ongoing wars, sales of missiles to Iran and shifts towards being a fascist state. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,6-2470215,00.html http://www.allheadlinenews.com/articles/7005629014
Are we seeing a new threat emerging here? Russia has yet to be fully incorporated in the post Soviet world, and it probably won't. 15 years ago, Russia was still considered a serious threat to international security. Will all the talk of the Middle East as primary zone of conflict, everyone has forgotten that inter-state conflict is still always possible.

Closer to home Litvinenko actually lived in Muswell Hill, where this blog is from.

The Grand Bargain?

2006-11-14T22:18:00.000Z

Call me a naive idealistic political fantasist, but put Ehud Olmert, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Bashar al-Assad and George W Bush together in a room, let each one make a significant compromise (return to pre 1967 borders, renouncing nuclear ambitions, end terrorist funding and threats of punitive sanctions, etc), sign on the dotted line (in blood if need be) and voila we have an enduring Middle East peace. Tony Blair and Hassan Nasrallah by the way, would be waiting outside desperate to get in on the deal, but Mahmoud Abbas and Nouri Maliki would be anxiously holding their breath for the right result.

Now this would be grandest of Grand Bargains, fairly inconceivable given how deep mistrust is and how fragile any sort of agreement is in the region. But the tectonic plates under the Middle East might just be heading in this direction. Not in one stride, but resembling a pyramid structure of lesser bargains upon which grander and grander bargains build up.

Despite the early jostling for position, the momentum seems to be heading for rapprochement with Syria and Iran, most likely after the publication of the Iraq Survey Group's findings. Attempts to split Syria and Iran will probably work, resulting in a lesser “Bargain” with al-Assad. The trade off being limited culpability for the Hariri assassination and cessation of Hamas support; for military co-operation in western Iraq and removal from the state sponsors of terrorism list. Iran will be harder, given the levels of animosity built up since 1979, and the regular rhetoric spurted out by Ahmadinejad, Bush and Olmert/Netanhayu. But with Syria in from the cold, a deal could provide momentum.

Tony Blair, in his speech to the Lord Mayor's banquet, disagreed that this was the starting point: "On the contrary, we should start with Israel/Palestine. That is the core." True it is the core, and has been so for nearly 60 years, but Israel whether under Olmert, Netanhayu or anyone else would not be prepared to make the necessary concessions without the removal of serious regional threats like Iran. That is why the Iran-US Grand bargain is the key.

Sadly the Iraq conflict and Iran's nuclear ambitions has pushed the Palestine question down the priority list, Israel an insecure paranoid state at best of times has no reason to compromise, with Hizbullah, Iran, etc, firing out the threats.

As for Iraq itself, I am not entirely convinced that Iran and Syria can make a significant difference. Neither can control Al-Qaeda (despite recent reports) and Shia militias are rife with rivalry rather than being one contiguous movement. Even if the Grand Bargain is achieved it might not guarantee results on Iran's side at least. And is it actually with the right countries, Saudi Arabia has an immense border with Iraq and is the source of the majority of Islamic radicals.

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/article/0,,7374-2453802,00.html
http://english.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/93F34036-5AB5-46BD-8D8F-1A6F0EF17628.htm

The other election...

2006-11-12T13:04:00.000Z

A few thousand miles away from the political earthquake in Washington last week, another election took place in the Americas. Just as the Republican era seemed to be ending, a former adversary Daniel Ortega was completing his presidential victory in Nicaragua. There is an irony here (I am sure of it), Tuesday's congressional election will surely lead to the final clear out of Reaganites who Bush brought in at the start of his administration; whilst their nemesis during the 1980s is resurrecting his political career.

As a leading member of the FSLN (Frente Sandinista de Liberación Nacional), Ortega assumed de facto control in 1981 of Nicaragua, bringing the central American state into a Marxist alliance with Cuba, in stark opposition to its right wing past under Somoza's Sandinistas. The ensuing guerrilla war against US backed "contras", led to thousands of deaths, but also came to represent probably the low point of the Reagan doctrine: preventing the spread of communism in the Americas by any means and using any proxy available.

So what future lies ahead for Nicaragua and Latin America for that matter in the post Bush world? Either he will follow the Chavez path of confrontation or he will, encouraged by consensus seeking Democrats, follow a more centrist path than 25 years before.

Kosovo - the next chapter

2006-11-09T10:59:00.000Z

The tempestuous relationship between Serbia and Kosovo continued yesterday, as Serbia's parliament formally adopted a new constitution reasserting claims over the ethnic Albanian province. Possible independence was also ruled out, with preamble references to Kosovo as part of Serbia, despite its current status as a UN-protectorate and ongoing international negotiations over its future.

Kosovo's place in history was seared by the ethnic cleansing campaigns of 1998/99, and subsequent NATO bombing. Probably a pivotal moment for all three statesman/protagonists involved: Clinton, Milosevic and Blair. For Clinton, it was one final opportunity to define his "Doctrine", that of liberal interventionism and to make up for previous failings in Bosnia and Somalia. For Milosevic, it was the beginning of the end, indicted for war crimes soon after, he would be overthrown in September 2000. For Blair, the war marked his emergence as a leading global statesman, as well as further developing his belief in Clintonian liberal/humanitarian interventionism regardless of UN authority, a policy that peaked in the 2003 Iraq war.

Historic claims over Kosovo are central to Serb identity. The inception of Serb nationalism was in Kosovo; Serb religious and cultural tenets have emerged from the province. Kosovo had rested on the fringes of the Byzantine Empire, inhabited by Slavic and Illyrian peoples, until Serb Prince Stefan Nemanja seized parts of Kosovo in the 1180s. Serb Orthodox churches and monasteries developed in Kosovo throughout the next century, as Serbs became the majority over Albanians, in an economically important part of the Balkans. Ottoman pressure led to the Battle of Kosovo – a seminal moment for Serbia. The defeat of Prince Lazar in June 1389 by the Ottomans is often regarded as the birth date of Serb nationalism.

Fastforward exactly 600 years, and a Serbian nationalist politician Slobodan Milosevic makes a provocative and ultra-nationalistic speech, on his way to becoming Serbia's leader. Kosovo was not included in the 1995 Dayton Accords, and in the final chapter of 1990s Balkan wars, Serb security forces and the KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) fought a guerrilla war resulting in 10,000 deaths and thousands displaced.

It's hard to say if this will be the final chapter, Kosovo's prime minister today announced that he might declare independence from Serbia unilaterally, if UN negotiations fail. Serbia will object, but they will ultimately have to accept, given the overbearing threat of NATO force. Serbia is a beautiful country with warm generous people and it would be tragic if another bloody chapter was to begin after these developments.

http://www.guardian.co.uk/worldlatest/story/0,,-6202647,00.html
http://today.reuters.co.uk/news/articlenews.aspx?type=worldNews&storyID=2006-11-09T122728Z_01_BYT933611_RTRUKOC_0_UK-SERBIA-KOSOVO.xml&pageNumber=0&imageid=&cap=&sz=13&WTModLoc=NewsArt-C1-ArticlePage2

Judgement day(s)

2006-11-08T22:45:00.000Z

Two days: 5th and 8th of November 2006 will be significant dates for future historians. Representing book ends in the histories of both the United States and Iraq; reflecting their painfully intertwined pasts. Sunday 5th November, Iraqi courts announced that Saddam Hussein will be executed for crimes against humanity, marking the end of his iconic presence in Iraq's history. Wednesday 8th November, defeat in midterm elections for Bush and the Republicans, leads to the resignation of Donald Rumsfeld Secretary of Defense. As a principal architect of the war, his departure could possibly mark the end of a sorry chapter in Iraqi and depending on your viewpoint, US history. The appointment of Robert Gates and Democrat control of Congress will without doubt create a change of course for both countries and their relationship.

Rumsfeld and Saddam infamously met in 1983, sent their armies to battle each other 20 years later, and now have been consigned to face ignominious places in history within the space of the last four days.

It's all about oil....

2006-11-08T14:11:00.000Z

Yes sadly my dissertation is.....all about oil. Currently on the back burner, but still in my thoughts, and tying in nicely with the US fp course. The research focus is the Shah of Iran, the 1973 oil crisis and US foreign policy under Kissinger and Nixon at that time. In December 1973, the Shah decided to increase oil prices by 400%, following the oil embargo during the October war between the Arabs and Israel. The result was an economic downturn in Western Europe, parts of Asia and the United States. Given that the Shah was one of the US' staunch allies in the region, why did he instigate such an increase?

Here lies the debate. The Shah's one time prime minister, and court confidante Amir Asadollah Alam, attributes it to re-assertion of Persian prestige and regional influence; Secretary of State Henry Kissinger places the Shah's ego as a key motivation; then mixed into these positions is William Engdahl's view that price rises were secretly conspired by Western elites (including Kissinger) on a Swedish island in May 1973. The histiorography is equally contraversial and compelling.

On top these diverse views, I will be considering US foreign policy at the time. The importance of Iran as a client state: as a bulwark against the Soviet Union and regional policeman. The advent of the Nixon doctrine; pursuit of Detente; outbreak of the Yom Kippur war; British de-colonisation in the Gulf also shaped the historical context for this economic shockwave.

So to summarise: What context drove this decision? What motivation defined this decision? And what impact did this decision have on Iran-US relations?

The Other Allies

2006-10-20T13:36:00.000Z

To withdraw or not withdraw is the current political question on both sides of the Atlantic. But what about those other countries still present in Iraq, members of the so called Coalition of the Willing? One member, Slovakia, has announced this week its intention to withdraw by February 2007. What plans do the others have for withdrawal; what do their populations wish for out of the whole project? Originally, not an unhealthy number of 49, this group of predominantly Eastern European and US friendly Latin American and South-East Asian states, now totals 23 (not including US and UK). Their impact in this whole debate may be of little significance, you might say, given that the US accounts for over 90% of the troops, but they still retain the one quality that they have always held - providing legitimacy. Whether these countries provided a couple of tank mechanics, a few chefs for Coalition mess halls, or some conscripts to clean US army boots, is irrelevant, having 49 separate co-operating states adds plenty of political capital.

For these so called Allies, what are there actual objectives from being there? It’s ridiculous to imagine that Mongolia or Honduras could have felt threatened by Saddam’s WMD or by Al-Qaeda either. The cynic would say it was purely to improve US trade relations; an ardent multinationalist might argue that they attempted to show their humanitarian solidarity. But since when have the peoples of Iceland or Tonga cared for anyone in the Middle East. I have to admit I have never met anyone from either of these countries, but it’s hard to see their intentions as...quixotic. If US withdraws, then all the other countries would have to withdraw... or would they? Can you imagine Estonia single-handedly taking on the insurgents?

Poland, leader of the Multinational security force south of Baghdad, has been a staunch US ally, losing 20 soldiers to date. In July 2005, 59% of Poles surveyed by PBS Sopot said all Polish troops should be withdrawn from Iraq as soon as possible; whilst in another poll 67% felt that it had been the wrong decision to participate at all.

The totality of World War II could be considered the pinnacle of coalition building, but more as states faced the bleak choice of alliance or destruction. The use of multinational forces during the Cold War was sporadic: the Vietnam conflict gathered Australia, New Zealand and South Korea as allies; the ill-fated multinational force (MNF) that arrived in Lebanon after the PLO evacuation in August 1982 consisted of US, French, Italian and British troops. The post Cold War environment has been different. Wider coalition forming has been possible, with the absence of bipolar constraints. The first Gulf war was the yardstick for this new freedom of co-operation, with countries as diverse as Senegal and Norway taking part, and former Soviet spheres Syria and Czechoslovakia also involved. The establishment of IFOR (International Fellowship of Reconciliation) and SFOR in Bosnia after the Dayton peace accords, included NATO members and non NATO states: Morocco, Argentina and Russia. UN peacekeeping activities have played a greatly expanded role since 1989, acting to resolve regional conflicts which were often fuelled by the two superpowers during the Cold War.

Coalition building is often the key to legitimacy. With modern armies subject to financial and human limitations (bar the US), the burden needs to be spread globally. Participation by Third World states is also a means of enhancing international prestige and trade opportunities. But critically when this legitimacy is not achieved, public support collapses. The failure to achieve legitimate goals in Iraq has questioned domestic commitment to intervention like no other conflict. This will most likely be the legacy for these states.

Whereas for most Iraqis, they probably don't know where half these countries are, let alone have seen any impact on their daily lives by them.

This post is still in drafting…

Sanctioned confusion

2006-10-15T20:56:00.001Z

Given Kim Jong-il's eccentricity and its “Janus” status, I’m hoping that the sanctions imposed by the UN inadvertently resolve this crisis, but it’s not going to be that simple… The word sanction falls in the genre of autoantonyms, contranyms, or antilogies, yes it is true, or in other words - having dual meaning. Derived from the Latin, sancire, its original meaning was 'to make an offense punishable by law', but this developed to mean ‘express permission contained in a law to do something’, or simply authorise. In the world of high pressure international diplomacy and in particular the world of Kim Jong-il, unfortunate misinterpretations are only a slip of the tongue away. This varied etymology also seems to reflect its mixed success and consequences when applied to international relations over the years. Another baffling sanctions question is that no other word seems to rhyme with it....

Prior to 1990, sanctions had only been applied to the former Rhodesia and South Africa. Their use has been expanded since to include Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia and Eritrea, Ivory Coast, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Iraq, Liberia, Libya, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Somalia, the former Yugoslavia and Sudan. The extent to these sanctions has varied from straightforward arms embargoes in particular for African conflicts to full economic sanctions, such as against Iraq from 1990 to 2003. Sanctions on the whole work, especially when carefully targeted, for example in the South African case when sports, cultural and trade restrictions hurt the white population, upon which apartheid governments relied. Libya is another success with Gaddafi coming in from the cold two years ago. The Iraq example represents the other end of scale, when they contained a dictator’s ambitions but at the cost of crippling an economy and causing nearly a million indirect deaths. The corruption of the UN oil for food programme exposed post Saddam and the apparent preservation of a WMD capability, pre 2003, marked their failure. The lesson drawn from Iraq for North Korea must be that successfully imposing sanctions against authoritarian dictators is exceptionally difficult. Creating enough pressure for a state to submit to international will is hard enough, but when a leader has a paranoid persecution complex, its only going to send him deeper into his bunker.

Solutions? This is far more difficult than Iraq, because a) they have the bomb, b) Kim il-Jong is not predictable and c) there is no current alternative to him. Credible opposition groups do not exist inside or outside North Korea. Realistically direct talks are the only solution here, as sanctions are only going to antagonise the situation further. Although it’s encouraging to see the international community united on this issue, the lack of options isn’t.

http://www.abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=2569249&page=1
http://www.nkfreedomhouse.org/resources/north-korea/state-of-affairs/

Course schedule...

2006-10-15T11:53:00.001Z

Here is a quick run-down of this year's course:
Week 1, The American Foreign Policy Tradition
Week 2, The Cold War, 1945-1991
Week 3, The Interregnum: 1991-2001
Week 4, The Bush Doctrine
Week 5, American Empire
Week 7, War and the Constitution
Week 8, The Presidency
Week 9, Congress
Week 10, The Executive Bureaucracy
Week 11, Public Opinions
Week 12, Interest Groups
Week 13, Defence Policy
Week 14, The CIA and Intelligence
Week 15, Terrorism and Counterterrorism
Week 17, The Middle East
Week 18, Europe
Week 19, The 'Special Relationship'
Week 20, Final session

General disorder!

2006-10-14T17:18:00.000Z

It's always refreshing when our Establishment speak forth with a degree of veracity. General Sir Richard Dannatt's comments this week that British troops are exacerbating the problem, cuts through the hubristic face saving rhetoric that has drizzled out over the last 3 years from Number 10, MOD or any other participant in the war. It's hard to not feel immensely sorry for the soldiers out there; maybe they should re-introduce national service, but only for politicians so that they know the full implications of their decisions. I think the General's comments on outstaying our welcome are particularly sharp: "We are in a Muslim country and Muslims' views of foreigners in their country are quite clear." I don't actually believe it, but it is hard not to think that there has been no Muslim input into government policy on Iraq from day 1. The contrast between our aims and how we are perceived is pretty startling.
http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq/Story/0,,1921450,00.html

It seems that where we are now is not too dissimilar to post WWII and the painful process of decolonisation. Just as the British left India and Palestine, only for wars to erupt, we are at the same threshold. Withdrawal without proper security in tact could lead to full blown civil war, genocide and regional conflict. But Iraq is now a sovereign state and at some point they are going to have to resolve their own issues regardless of how difficult this may be. Those are the two sides of it, it isn't going to be pretty either way.

The Sum of All Fears.......

2006-10-12T14:32:00.000Z

Today's publication of the Lancet's report totalling the number of violent deaths in Iraq since the 2003 invasion, inevitably divides and jolts opinion as pretty much anything else relating to the "I" word does these days. Regardless of which side of the argument you fall, these figures are pretty shocking. Estimates of total deaths vary from Bush's conservative 30,000 earlier this year, which would probably be revised upwards to nearer 40,000 regardless of how opaque his bubble is; to the 48,000 cited on Iraqbody count; to wider anti war campaigner's estimates hitting the 200,000 mark; and finally the Lancet's 655,000 figure. Numbers never describe the full picture, but since on the ground narrative cannot paint the full picture beyond reports through high risk journalism; repetitive photos showing burnt out cars and blood stained concrete; or simple old fashioned fraternal embedding; we are forced into this numerical irrelevance. Add / subtract a zero, it really doesn't matter sadly; neither 2,973 (the same as 9/11) nor the Lancet's latest total creates any cause for happiness. These figures, shocking as they are, pale in comparison to history's wars, the 62 million who died in WWII is an almost unimaginable number. Would it be possible to record 62 million individual stories of pain, tradegy and death. No. Just in the same way as it wouldn't be possible to pay testimony to 655,000 either. It is this side of war numbers that is the most painful for history, life's insignificance and history's inability to record the memory of those who perished. Journalists and historians will try and focus on numerous key individuals but history is not able to treat all with equality.

http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/war-1900.htm

The Nuclear Northerners!

2006-10-09T10:27:00.000Z

This morning's news that North Korea has conducted its first nuclear test is pretty shocking to most people in the world, escpecially to those living in South Korea, Japan and probably China as well. The depiction of Kim Jong-il in the film Team America is probably not a million miles away. Extravagant tastes in lobster, silver chopsticks, outlandish neo Soviet architecture combined with support for regional terrorist groups and willingness to share nuclear technology with Iran and Sadamm Hussein's scientists, places him as the world's evil mastermind of death and destruction number two, behind the elusive UBL. The nexus of WMD and terrorism, dramatically eluded to prior to the Iraq war, is probably one step nearer as a result of today's events. With both military action and sanctions discredited as realistic responses, it's probably time for some third way thinking. Fortunately we are likely to see a South Korean approved as UN secretary general this week to offer some fresh perspective. I am hoping, like the majority, that he can get off to a flyer and impart wisdom for his northern bullying brethen.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/6032525.stm

This is a re-launch

2006-10-03T22:20:00.000Z

Some minor re-branding has been going on behind the scenes here (well, audience figures dropped as this year went on). New term starts this week. American foreign policy.

This blog is going to expand, so watch this spoce...

Lebanon

2006-05-29T12:00:00.000Z

Who gained from the Lebanon war of 1982 and what were the long term consequences for the Arab-Israeli conflict?

Although the initial objectives of Operation Peace for Galilee were achieved quickly in June 1982, the expansion into and prolonged presence of Israel in Lebanon brought about far reaching consequences, for not just Israel and the Palestinians, but the whole region and international community. As external involvement in Lebanon deepened, whether Israeli, Palestinian, Syrian or American, new threats and objectives emerged. It is for this reason that judging who benefited and lost is difficult. But the upheaval and violence that did occur in Lebanon following the Israeli invasion meant that there were significant consequences for all parties involved in the period after. An analysis of the consequences of the war can be considered by looking at the military results; the subsequent internal conflicts; developments in the occupied territories and peace process; the diplomatic community’s actions and shifts in regional relations.

Between the end of Lebanese civil war in 1975-6 and the Israeli invasion on 6 June 1982, PLO presence in South Lebanon had become of increasing concern to Israeli political leaders and military, and a plan to eliminate this presence developed under Ariel Sharon and Menachem Begin of the Likud government. After exchanges between the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) and Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) in 1981 and early 1982, plus occasional terrorist operations in northern Israel, an invasion became inevitable. Planned and presented as a limited initiative[1], the initial objective was a 40km incursion into South Lebanon aimed at suppressing PLO artillery fire. Although a quick success, PLO guerrillas and leaders were able to retreat to Beirut. The IDF continued their northwards push, attacking Syrian positions in the Beqaa valley, and in alliance with Christian Phalangist forces completed an encirclement of the capital on June 30.[2] The siege of Beirut marked the final stage of Operation Peace for Galilee ending in late August with the evacuation of PLO guerrillas under the supervision of a multinational force. As the invasion developed, it revealed shifting Israeli objectives, in particular Sharon’s, creating additional consequences in the immediate and distant future.

After the evacuation of PLO guerrillas, Israel’s secondary objective of securing a peace treaty with Lebanon came to the fore. But the failure to implement the May 17th 1983 treaty under US mediation, led to Israel’s withdrawal and the establishment of a security zone in South Lebanon in June 1985. Internal Lebanese conflicts also re-emerged in 1983, as Druze and Christian militias fought in the Chouf mountains. During this period the conflict brought in the United States and regional states Iran and Syria, creating events that laid foundations for several long term problems in the Middle East.

Military and civilian casualties during not just the Israeli invasion, but the prolonged civil war that lasted from 1975 to 1990, were significant. Total deaths during the civil war are estimated at 150,000, of which 17,825 casualties followed the 1982 invasion.[3] Beyond these figures, the impact on military structures and ideologies was profound for all sides involved.

Israel set about re-drawing the political map of the Middle East through their invasion.[4] A swift military victory was achieved, incurring far fewer losses than other sides, but Israel developed new enemies and lost significant self esteem along the way. Lebanese and Palestinian civilians suffered the most as the IDF pushed towards Beirut. The actual siege of Beirut resulted in an estimated 2,461 deaths.[5] After the expansion of its campaign against Syrian targets in early June, Israel destroyed the elite of the Syrian air force - gaining air superiority.

Each respective militaries experienced significant changes due to the 1982 war. The first stage of Operation Peace for Galilee was a success for the IDF, as a total of 80,000 troops, 1,240 tanks and 1,520 personnel carriers[6] advanced through 3 different zones, assisted by air and naval support along the Lebanese coast. This stage of the conflict witnessed heavy military force used against PLO targets in South Lebanon. Familiar military tactics were also employed during the siege of Beirut, with a 7 week aerial bombardment, as Israel attempted to crush Palestinian resistance. Israel’s position as the military superpower in the region was confirmed in autumn 1982, but as Israel started its withdrawal in 1983 and 1984, a new military challenge emerged.

The IDF had been initially welcomed by the southern Shia population, but the continued presence turned the indigenous population against them. Especially as the IDF established bases and detention camps, built roads with signs in Hebrew,[7] and adopted ‘iron fist’ tactics against guerrillas.[8] The Shia population provided the foundation for militant movements Hizbullah and Amal to develop, employing terrorist and guerrilla tactics against Israel, culminating in hundreds of attacks against Israel in December 1984[9] followed by suicide attacks in early 1985. Following its withdrawal in June 1985, Israel established a security zone 15km north of the border, in alliance with the predominantly Christian South Lebanon Army (SLA), who they had helped create under major Saad Haddad in 1976. The tensions in the security zone between the Hizbullah and Israel’s proxy force - the SLA - would be a military issue for the next 15 years. The initial invasion cost approximately 650 IDF lives, but the war of attrition that followed between Israel and Hizbullah would claim an average of 20-30 IDF lives per year.[10] The SLA lost 410 soldiers between 1985 and 1999.[11]

The Palestinians as the primary target of the invasion suffered the greatest losses. Accurate casualty figures are difficult to ascertain, partly due to the brutal nature of the invasion and lack of on the spot reports, but also due to the PLO’s integration into the infrastructure of south Lebanon.[1] PLO bases and artillery were overwhelmed and outnumbered by the IDF, as their inappropriate military tactics became apparent. Having been forced back into Beirut, the PLO remained under sustained attack from both Israeli and Phalangist forces, until the evacuation of their leadership, plus 10,054 guerrillas by sea and land.[12] A similar number of fighters would remain in Lebanon and would fight against Amal militia between 1985 and 1987 in the War of the Camps

In military terms the Lebanese Phalangist army, although allies of the IDF, were an inferior and less disciplined force. Under Israeli guidance, they completed the encirclement of Beirut, but expected the IDF to do all the work.[13] Israel hoped that they would provide the military support for a new friendly and Christian dominated Lebanese government, which would be a second regional peace partner after Egypt. This failed to happen as strong opposition to a Christian Maronite dominated government emerged. Israel also formed an alliance with the extremist militia The Guardians of the Cedars: an alarming move for Lebanese Palestinians, who had often been their previous victims.

Both the Amal and Druze militia initially avoided confrontation with Israel, but would indirectly involve the IDF during campaigns against the Palestinians in the south and Phalangists in the Chouf Mountains. Once the PLO evacuation had finished, Israel was placed in an uncomfortable role as peacemaker, and their withdrawal from this position re-ignited the Lebanese civil war.[14] Syria suffered severe initial losses: 30 surface-to-air missiles, 85 front-line aircraft and 350 tanks[15], but eventually regained a strategic advantage by its backing of different militias. The ceasefire between the IDF and Syrian army along the Beirut-Damascus highway was regarded as a victory of sorts for Syria, as they held the Israeli army at bay.[16] Syrian intelligence played an influential role as it cultivated alliances with militia leaders of all sectarian persuasions[17], and was implicated for the assassination of Phalangist leader Bashir Gemayel and the collapse of May 17 agreement. Syria backed the militias of the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP) and Al-Murabitun.

These militias exploited the power vacuum left by the PLO’s evacuation. Fuelled by the heavy weaponry left behind[18], they resumed their previous rivalries. Al-Murabitun and other Arab nationalist inspired militias co-ordinated under the National Movement, backed by Syria and headed by Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, and fought against Phalangists allied with the Lebanese army. Hizbullah and Amal would lead this anti-Israel resistance in the post 1985 period.

The war had a polarising effect for both Israel and the Palestinians, and initial gains transformed into negative outcomes and vice versa for both sides. After a swift victory, Israel’s prolonged presence in Lebanon would create internal political and social divisions. Despite a heavy defeat and dispersal of its political infrastructure, the PLO and - Yasser Arafat especially - emerged with an enhanced reputation.

Following the evacuation in August 1982, a proportion of PLO guerrillas were dispersed to other Middle Eastern countries, whilst part of the remaining PLO split from Arafat’s Fatah to indulge in a murderous fratricidal war.[19] Arafat’s leadership was questioned in the aftermath of the Lebanon war by guerrilla groups – the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP). Against a political settlement with Israel, they formed a ‘loyal’ opposition, critical of Arafat yet willing to accept his leadership and loyal to the PLO framework.[20] At the same time rejectionist groups PFLP-GC and Saiqa, based in Damascus, sought to overthrow Arafat.

These splits in the PLO were the direct result of the pressure brought on the Palestinians in Lebanon by a heavy defeat. The ejection from Beirut was blamed on “Arafat’s corruption, mistakes and concessions”.[21] Palestinian factions fought from May 1983 onwards, with Syrian backing emerging in late June.[22] The mutiny of PLO guerrillas forced Arafat to evacuate for the second time to Tunis, after the siege of Tripoli in December 1983. The rifts were repaired in July 1984 during talks held in South Yemen[23], but Arafat’s position remained precarious and he would be excluded from the diplomatic mainstream until 1987.[24] Despite this lack of direct influence, Arafat retained popularity in the occupied territories, and Fatah became influential in the occupied territories through Khalil Wazir’s Occupied Homeland Bureau.[25] Arafat’s position was secured as rejectionist groups lost support, the DFLP and PFLP joined Fatah at the 18th PNC meeting in April 1987, and the Palestinians sought greater independence – especially from Syria.

The upheaval that followed the 1982 invasion forced the Palestinian leadership to adopt a moderate line: recognising Israel and renouncing terrorism in 1988. However this placed them in a position of weakness for peace negotiations in the 1990s, as they had no military option and effective political strategy, making them an attractive peace partner for Israel.[26]

Syrian support for Palestinian terrorist organisations also split the moderate leadership from more extreme elements. The Abu Nidal organisation, a longstanding foe of Arafat, responsible for the assassination attempt on UK Ambassador Shlomo Argov that had triggered Israel’s invasion, embarked on a violent terrorist campaign in the 1980s. Whilst Arafat attempted to distance his movement from these acts; Israel sought to prove his links to international terrorism as justification for not negotiating with the PLO. The depth of these splits was shown by the assassination of Arafat’s 2nd in command, Salah Khalaf in 1991 by an Abu Nidal operative. Arafat’s efforts for peace negotiations during the 1980s were constantly hindered by these splinter groups. The Achille Lauro hijacking in October 1985 reinforced Israel’s refusal to deal with the PLO.

The Palestinians that resided in Lebanon experienced extremely turbulent times following the Israeli invasion. The PLO had been responsible for developing infrastructure in Lebanon, creating effectively a state-within-a-state. Israel’s invasion represented a systematic attempt to destroy the entire institutional infrastructure of the PLO, including its hospitals, clinics, factories, cultural bureaus, art galleries, schools and research centre.[27] Palestinian residents held a precarious position in Lebanese society. As refugees prior to 1982 they lacked any form of citizenship, and the enforcement of highly restrictive employment laws marginalized them further.[28] Attacked economically and militarily, the Palestinians’ problems were further compounded by squalid conditions in refugee camps, where sanitation was at a minimum. Palestinians remained a divisive element in Lebanese society, as they had been since 1967, and have remained second class citizens since.

The invasion of Lebanon was widely supported in Israel with 84% of the population in favour at the start, but support dropped to 51% by June 1983 and 36% in May 1985.[29] This decline in popularity was paralleled by emerging political and social divisions in Israel. Although initially successful, the war had significant intangible costs: political, military, economic and psychological, that would mark Israelis for years to come.[30]

The IDF was the social institution that was damaged by the war, as its role shifted from invaders to occupiers then part time peacekeepers. IDF morale, military effectiveness and reputation all suffered. As the strategy and justification of the war shifted under Sharon, political doubts filtered through to the IDF. The protracted occupation severely damaged the IDF as it became engaged in quasi-police functions experiencing continuous friction from the local population[31], and was frustrated by being unable to achieve ambitious political objectives set.

The war had cost in excess of $3.2bn by December 1984[32], a significant figure as Israel was in a period of economic difficulty. Faced with a large foreign debt and massive inflation rate, the Israeli government was forced to examine military expenditure in an unprecedented way, resulting in the defence budget being cut by $400m in 1984.[33]

These economic considerations fuelled political divisions, but it was on the front line where the Lebanon war had its greatest impact on Israeli society. As the IDF became booged down, previously unexperienced negative side effects developed included a high number of “friendly fire” incidents, young officers declining military careers and accidental deaths and injuries.[34] More seriously, were the effects of the war’s brutality and the “total lack of consideration for human life, human feelings and property”.[35] The Sabra and Shatilla massacre represented the pinnacle of this sentiment. The importance of the moral dimension was stated by Shimon Peres when justifying the 1985 withdrawal: “we have returned to our values as a nation, as a people, a nation that has principles”.[36] The shattering of Israel’s humanitarian image was a devastating moment in the country’s history.[37]

The 1982 war developed further the phenomenon of refuseniks, with the formation of Yesh-Gvul [2]. Israeli society has often been defined as militaristic or a “nation-in-arms”, with military service considered the most untouchable of Israeli society’s sacred cows.[38] As the war developed, and with it disillusionment, Yesh-Gvul collected 3,000 reserve soldiers’ signatures on a petition demanding exemption from military duty and criticising government policy.[39] Although never part of mainstream politics, the refuseniks reflected changes in Israeli society, with a decline in the acceptance of Zionist principles and preference for individualism over collectivism.[40] Peace Now which had formed in 1978, was also empowered by the war, and would play an important role in Israeli society, highly critical of government military policy.

The defining moment of the Lebanon war, that galvanised this opposition, was the Sabra and Shatilla massacre 16-17th September 1982, where 1,000 between 2,000 Palestinians were killed by the Phalangist militia.[41] Besides sparking large protests, there was a significant political fallout after the Kahan Commission led to resignations of Ariel Sharon (but who remained in the cabinet, as minister without portfolio) and chief of military intelligence Major General Yehoshua Saguy. The refusal of parts of Israeli society to acknowledge the massacre, plus Sharon’s continuing support from Likud members, were symptoms of political and social splits that emerged. Although a coalition government was formed in September 1984, harsh political debate had focused on the aftermath of the Lebanon war and there was increasing polarization between supporters and opponents of territorial compromise with the Palestinians.[42] These divisions provided the Israeli political background for peace negotiations in the future.

The implications of conflicts within the IDF and political system, was unprecedented self reflection of Israel’s military actions, an acute new sense of “the limits of power”[43], but most significantly the realisation that the Palestinian question still needed to be addressed. The genesis of the long process to peace negotiations in 1993 lies partly in the malaise that developed after the Lebanon war. Whilst the losses to Israeli society were significant, it gained a clear realisation that Palestinians represented an intractable problem and agreement with the Palestinians in the occupied territories was the priority.

Lebanese sectarians divisions were only worsened by the 1982 war. The absence of a PLO military and political presence created a vacuum, which the different militias tried to fill. The fragile balance that had existed since Lebanon’s formation in 1920, and had collapsed in the first stage of the civil war, was shattered by the removal of the PLO and the presence of Israeli troops. Inherent factionalism in Lebanon meant that civil war continued until 1989, when the Taif Agreement set out plans for political reform and withdrawal of Syrian troops, although no timetable was decided for this. Power was balanced towards the Muslim population, as the appointed Sunni prime minister and cabinet, attained more importance than the Maronite president. Lebanese Muslims were certainly the ultimate beneficiaries of the 1982 war, but this was due to Syria’s role. As will be discussed, Lebanese Christians were undone by their reliance on Israel and the United States, who failed to provide the necessary long term support.

***

The reasons for the invasion of Lebanon differ on opposing sides of the conflict. Palestinians believed Israel’s intentions were to destroy the PLO and their aspiration for an independent state. Israel’s justification was to destroy the PLO, who was considered responsible for anti-Israel terrorism and representing the main source of disruption in the occupied territories. Chief of staff Rafael Eitan had stated that the Lebanon war was “a war to consolidate the Israeli hold on Judea and Samaria”.[44] Since 1976, for the Palestinians Lebanon had represented a ‘war of liberation’ bound up with the aspiration for a return to Palestine.[45]

April 1982 had seen an explosion of protest and riots in the West Bank and Gaza, which was countered by repressive Israeli tactics. The Camp David peace accords had been interpreted by the Begin government differently to Palestinians, as autonomy for the occupied territories only resulted in more settlements and Israeli controlled civil administrations. Whilst direct attempts were made to destroy Palestinian nationalism in Lebanon, Israel also developed policies in the occupied territories, such as anti-PLO regulation in higher education.[46]

Palestinian fears in the occupied territories deepened with Israel’s swift victory, especially after the Sabra and Shatilla massacre, but as Israeli policy fell apart in Lebanon, international diplomatic efforts focused on the West Bank and Gaza, with the Fez Plan and Reagan initiative. Even though the PLO leadership was split and forced to relocate around the Middle East, it gained popularity as it survived the siege of Beirut providing a source of inspiration.[47]

Although the Begin government was replaced in 1984, conditions in the occupied territories did not improve, paving the way for the first Intifada. The Intifada developed from the increasingly harsh measures undertaken by the Israeli military from 1985 onwards; an emerging and restless Palestinian youth movement; economic decline in the occupied territories. The failed diplomacy that followed Lebanon and the lack of leadership in the West Bank and Gaza, with Islamist movements emerging instead, were also factors. All these conditions can be seen as consequences of the Lebanon war. The occupied territories have been since 1982, the pre-eminent location for the Palestinian struggle.

For Israel, the Intifada was a battle against Palestinian nationalism and essentially a continuation of the Lebanon war. The lessons of Lebanon had been learnt by parts of the Israeli political system, with Labor leaders opposing settler involvement in suppressing the Intifada, drawing parallels with the Phalangists.[48] But the PLO was still seen as the source of disturbances in the occupied territories and Israel’s main enemy.

***

European powers have been involved in Lebanon since France intervened in 1860 on behalf of the Maronites in the civil war against the Druze. An international commission met to develop new political structures in Lebanon, but sectarian divisions were exacerbated as European powers sought to influence and favour individual groups. Lebanon also absorbed European culture in the 19th century; the American University of Beirut was founded in 1866. Beirut’s strategic trading position reinforced Lebanon’s value, and from the First World War, European political and military power began to dominate Lebanon.[49]

Following this tradition of foreign intervention, the Multinational force (MNF) arrived in Lebanon in late August 1982 to supervise the evacuation of PLO fighters and provide stability. This objective was achieved, but as it attempted to bring stability, it would clash with Lebanese militias, and suffer heavy casualties itself. The simultaneous barracks bombings on 23rd October 1983 resulted in 241 American and 58 French casualties. The MNF completed its withdrawal on 31st March 1984. The MNF started its mission with benign intentions, but the complex and violent situation in Lebanon destined it to failure. No member gained from its participation and the United States’ reputation was especially damaged.

In the aftermath of the siege of Beirut and the Sabra and Shatilla massacre, US-Israeli relations were also strained. The Reagan administration sensed that they were misled by Israeli leaders’ objectives, seeing Israel now as the “Goliath” rather than the “David” of the Middle East[50]. The continued building of settlements in the West Bank and Gaza also met strong disapproval.[51] Sympathy for the Palestinian cause was certainly enhanced following the Beirut stage of the war, but despite initial pressure on Israel, relations were still strong and would be resumed by mid 1983. From the Israeli viewpoint, there were reassurances that they would retain US support, and this was reinforced by continued military aid. By 1986, America was pushing for closer relations with Israel through technological exchanges related to the Strategic Defense Initiative.[52] For the Palestinians, the belief that the United States was biased towards Israel only deepened, and this sentiment continued until the end of the Reagan administration. It was upon these opposing perceptions that the Reagan initiative was imposed, proposing a “far-reaching peace effort”, with the key points being: a freeze on the building of Israeli settlements, “self government by the Palestinians…in association with Jordan”, but not the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.[53]

The plan was opposed by the Israeli cabinet, because of its variance with the Camp David accords, the issue of East Jerusalem, Jewish settlements, the definition of autonomy, plus distrust of Jordan’s ability to prevent the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.[54] The United States’ failure to pressure Israel empowered their position and will to resist concessions[55], setting a precedent for future negotiations.

Palestinian opposition was based on Jordan’s involvement: partly by Arafat refusing to give King Hussein a mandate to speak for the Palestinians[56]; and partly from the rejectionist factions within the PLO. For Jordan, failure to find a common negotiating position with the PLO; lack of confidence in the United States’ ability to pressure Israel into concessions; and pressure from the Soviet Union to oppose the Plan, were all factors in King Hussein’s rejection.[57] Peace negotiations did not bring about the resolution of the conflict the United States had hoped for. Whilst the conflict continued with Israeli presence until May 1985 and fighting between Syrian backed militias and PLO until 1987, a comprehensive peace treaty was unlikely. PLO-Jordanian relations also slowly deteriorated culminating in the Arab summit in Amman, where Hussein snubbed Arafat.[58] The United States meanwhile resisted negotiating with the PLO during this period, as it did not recognise UN resolutions 242 and 338.

The United States role in the Lebanon war shifted during 1983, creating a distraction from peace negotiations, and changing its status in the Middle East. Just as Israel’s role in Lebanon shifted, the United States inevitably became involved in the conflict. As the Long Commission stated: “By the end of September 1983, the situation in Lebanon had changed to the extent that not one of the initial conditions upon which the mission statement was premised was still valid. The image of the USMNF, in the eyes of the factional militias, had become pro-Israel, pro-Phalange, and anti-Muslim.”[59] The bombings of the US Embassy in April 1983 and army barracks in October plus kidnappings of US citizens, revealed the animosity towards the American presence. It also elevated the war onto an inter-state level as Iran and Syria were accused of these attacks. United States warships attacked Syrian controlled areas in September 1983, during battles between the Lebanon army and Druze militia.[60] Once the United States had pledged support for Amine Gemayel’s Phalangists, it would be unable to withdraw peacefully. The failure of US policy in Lebanon sapped enthusiasm for involvement in the Middle East until 1991. It also escalated the rivalry with Iran, which had developed since the 1979 revolution through Ayatollah Khomeini’s foreign policy. The attacks on United States’ targets marked the birth of militant anti-Americanism. The mid 1980s saw an escalation in acts of international terrorism, and American presence in Lebanon made the United States a target.[61] The tactics used by Hizbullah were precursors to those adopted by Al-Qaida in the late 1990s.

As the 1982 war brought in the United States, it also increasingly involved the Soviet Union. Soviet support for the PLO and in particular for Syria was an increasingly significant factor in the post 1982 period, especially as Syria became in direct conflict with Israel and the United States. The initial invasion was difficult for the Soviet Union, as its two clients, were easily defeated by Israel, requiring a re-evaluation of Middle East policy.[62] The Soviets maintained support for Syria, providing $2billion worth of weapons and aircraft, sending 5,000 advisers and technicians, and installing an extensive command, control and communication structure.[63] As Syria increased its military strength in 1983, so did Soviet influence. Reagan laid partial blame for the barracks bombing on the Soviet presence. The Soviet Union also backed mediation efforts between PLO factions in July 1984.[64] Although Soviet influence in the region did not extend beyond the late 1980s, the assistance provided to Syria was significant. Firstly as it allowed Syria to undermine the United States mission militarily and to destroy the May 17 Agreement, secondly it ensured their political dominance in Lebanon in the future.

Syria was the state that gained most from the 1982 war. Its position from the 1975-6 civil war had been strong, having entered Lebanon to enforce a ceasefire in June 1976. Syria’s position strengthened after their defeat in June 1982, by assisting the Druze militia with artillery cover in the Chouf Mountains against the Phalangists;[65] and supporting Shia groups Amal and Hizbullah. Syria maintained a military presence of 40,000 troops, controlling 50 percent of Lebanon’s territory,[66] in particular the strategically important Bekaa valley.[67] From this position, Syria dominated Lebanon, whilst also strengthening relations with Iran and their negotiating position against Israel. Israel’s objective of installing a friendly government to its north failed, placing Syria in a strong position for any peace treaty. The Taif accords in 1989 confirmed Syria’s position in Lebanon. Assad’s desire for a Greater Syria, not just in Lebanon but Jordan and Israel, had been initiated by their successful result from the 1982 war. This would not be fulfilled despite an expansion of its military and sponsorship of terrorist attacks on Jordan, as the Syrian economy stagnated and the situation in Lebanon worsened in the late 1980s.

Relations between Syria and the PLO, in particular Arafat and Fatah, deteriorated from 1983 onwards. The rift developed from Arafat’s criticism of the lack of Syrian support for the PLO in June 1982, his refusal to move PLO headquarters to Damascus, and moves towards diplomatic negotiations with Israel.[68] The Syrian backed Fatah mutiny in May 1983 was aimed at restraining Arafat rather than deposing him. A consequence of this PLO weakness was its absorption into Arab states, with Arafat being without a regional headquarters or patron. As Assad, stated in January 1985: “Syria will lead the Palestinian struggle henceforth”.[69] The contrast between the Syrian opinion of Arafat and his image in the occupied territories was another factor in causing the Intifada.

Iran established a foothold in the Arab-Israeli conflict through its involvement in Lebanon. As Syria’s only Arab ally, they were encouraged to become involved, sending hundreds of revolutionary guards into the Bekaa valley to establish a military headquarters.[70] The bombings of the United States embassy and barracks have been attributed to Iranian linked terrorists. Following the embassy bombing, a phone call from an Islamic Jihad member stated that the operation was “part of the Iranian revolution’s campaign against the imperialist presence throughout the world”. A superpower in an unstable regional state provided an ideal target for Iranian foreign policy.

Iranian antipathy to the United States had existed since the revolution, but the Lebanon conflict also worsened Israeli-Iranian relations. Despite the existence of arms trade between the two states during the 1980s, relations deteriorated primarily through Iranian funding for Hizbullah’s military campaign and sponsorship of acts of international terrorism like the Buenos Aires bombings of Jewish targets in 1992 and 1994. Although Shi’ite antipathy to Israel was high in south Lebanon, the Iranian influence was critical in creating a new enemy for Israel. The mullahs who formed Hizbullah identified with the revolution’s ideology and professed allegiance to Khomeini.[71] Hizbullah and Iran also share the goals of recovery of Jerusalem and liberation of historic Palestine.[72] In addition, the IDF presence in south Lebanon and unpopular military tactics used presented an opportunity for Iran to gain influence which it holds up until the present day.

To counter Syria’s plans for dominance, Israel pushed for a peace treaty with Lebanon, backed by the United States. The May 17 agreement called for a termination of the state of war between the two countries, implementation of security arrangements on the border, and withdrawal of Israeli forces. Syria’s withdrawal was also a requirement and this was quickly opposed, then undermined by Syria. The withdrawal in May 1985 and establishment of a security zone had a long and painful legacy for Israel. For the IDF, the occupation of south Lebanon would extract a heavy toll of casualties, but the political and diplomatic impact was equally significant. Political disputes in Israel over withdrawal developed in the 1990s, whilst Syria continued to assist Hizbullah’s low level military campaign as a means of gaining an advantage in negotiations over the Golan Heights. The stalemate that existed had a draining effect on Israeli politicians and public.

Hizbullah was the only militia allowed to openly retain arms after the Taif Accords in 1989.[73] From 1985, they undertook a guerrilla war against the SLA and IDF. Israel responded with large military operations – Accountability (1993) and Grapes for Wrath (1996) – but different “conditions in the regional security environment” during the peace process of the 1990s, made large scale militarily action difficult to justify.[74] Public opposition to the occupation in Israel also developed at this time creating a political environment for a withdrawal and also a possible peace treaty with Syria in the late 1990s.

***

The extreme and brutal nature of the Lebanon war left deep scars for all those involved. Military losses were significant, but the social and economic destruction, the development of numerous militias and alliances, and the political repercussions left a legacy that still exists in the Middle East. Whether the situation in Lebanon worsened solely due to Israel’s invasion is debatable, given the internal conflicts, but their presence created a new set of problems.

Lebanon’s strategic position brought foreign involvement from 1982 onwards. The opportunity for Syria and Iran to pressurise Israel and the United States via Lebanon was provided by the war. Consequentially, Israel-US relations were strengthened by military necessity; long term regional rivalries, in particular between United States and Iran, were developed.

It would be hard to argue that the Palestinians gained anything immediately from the invasion, but the excessive force and dire conditions that followed brought international support, where it had not existed before. The invasion developed internal Palestinian tensions, but the relocation and change of focus to the occupied territories, paved the way eventual peace negotiations in the early 1990s, despite the failed diplomacy in the immediate post war period.

Israel’s losses were spread over a longer duration, as they were drawn into a low level war with Hizbullah. The Lebanon war and occupation left a psychological legacy for Israel, and also slowly empowered regional enemies Syria and Iran. Having set out to destroy the PLO in 1982, they would be undertaking peace negotiations with them 9 years later.

***

[1] PLO guerrilla casualties are estimated to be anywhere between 1,000 (Associated Press 5th March 1991) and 10,000 (An Nahar)
[2] Translated as “There is a limit/border”
[1] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.573
[2] http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/3-06/appa.htm.
[3] http://users.erols.com/mwhite28/warstat3.htm.
[4] Seymour M. Hersh, The Samson Option (Random House, 1991), p.259
[5] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.256
[6] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.574
[7] Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, ‘Israel’s south Lebanon imbroglio’, Middle East Quarterly, June 1997
[8] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.577
[9] Ibid, p.571
[10] Laura Zittrain Eisenberg, ‘Israel’s south Lebanon imbroglio’, Middle East Quarterly, June 1997
[11] Anthony H Cordesman, Israel and Lebanon: The Risk of New Conflicts (Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2000), p.23
[12] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.350
[13] Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (Simon & Schuster, 1984), p.190
[14] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.629
[15] William Claiborne, ‘Victory gives Israel new power in Mideast’, Washington Post, 19th June 1982
[16] Ze’ev Schiff and Ehud Ya’ari, Israel’s Lebanon War (Simon & Schuster, 1984), p.307
[17] Daniel Nassif, ‘Maj. Gen. Ghazi Kanaan’, Middle East Intelligence Bulletin, January 2000
[18] Loren Jenkins, ‘Leftists stake out territory; militias menace Beirut pact’, Washington Post, 29th August 1982
[19] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.529
[20] Yezid Sayigh, ‘Struggle within, struggle without: the transformation of PLO politics since 1982’, International Affairs, 1989/2/ pp.247-271
[21] Mahmoud Labani, PLO rebels spokesman, quoted in Flora Lewis, ‘Rebels in PLO want it to be more militant’, New York Times, 16th October 1983
[22] Thomas Friedman, ‘PLO rebels seize 8 Arafat positions’, New York Times, 22nd June 1985
[23] Ihsan A. Hijazi, ‘Arafat says PLO rifts are healed’, New York Times, 2nd July 1984
[24] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.670
[25] Yezid Sayigh, ‘Struggle within, struggle without: the transformation of PLO politics since 1982’, International Affairs, 1989/2/ pp.257
[26] Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict (Bedford / St. Martin’s, 2001), p.412
[27] Cheryl A. Rubenberg, ‘The Civilian Infrastructure of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation: An analysis of the PLO in Lebanon until June 1982’, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol.12, No.3, (Spring 1983) p.54
[28] Julie Peteet, ‘From Refugees to Minority: Palestinians in post-war Lebanon’, Middle East Report, July / September 1996.
[29] Edward Walsh, ‘Israel’s 3-year war in Lebanon ends, but some troops remain behind’, Washington Post, 7th June 1985
[30] Ibid
[31] Edward Walsh, ‘Lebanon has sapped Israel’s army’, Washington Post, 20th April 1985
[32] Ian Black, ‘The shelling of the military / cost of defence spending for Israeli economy’, The Guardian, 3rd December 1984
[33] Ibid
[34] Edward Walsh, ‘War shakes Israel’s reserves’, Washington Post, 21st April 1985
[35] Eitan Haber in Yediot Ahronot, cited in Edward Walsh, ‘War shakes Israel’s reserves’, Washington Post, 21st April 1985
[36]Henry Kamm, ‘For Peres, pullout has moral value’, New York Times, 1st May 1985
[37]Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.407-408
[38] Ariel Dloomy, ‘The Israeli Refuseniks: 1982-2003’, Israeli Affairs, Vol 11, No.4, October 2005, pp.696-7
[39] Ibid, p.702
[40] Ibid, p.695
[41] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.390
[42] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.648
[43] Shlomo Avineri, Professor of Political Science at Hebrew University and director general of Israeli foreign ministry quoted in Edward Walsh, ‘Israel’s 3-year war in Lebanon ends, but some troops remain behind’, Washington Post, 7th June 1985
[44] Joe Stork & Jim Paul, ‘The War in Lebanon’, Merip Reports, September / October 1982
[45]Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.79
[46] Edward Walsh, ‘Bitter pride; West Bank Arabs angry at US, feel PLO remains unbowed’, Washington Post, 10th October 1982
[47] Ibid
[48] Labor minister Moshe Shahal in Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.702
[49] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.61
[50] Steven R. Weisman, ‘Reagan said to see Israel as the Mideast’s “Goliath”, not “David”, New York Times, 23rd September 1982
[51] John M. Goshko, ‘US brands decision as “most unwelcome”’, Washington Post, 6th September 1982
[52] Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli conflict (Bedford / St. Martin’s, 2001), p.412
[53] Ronald Reagan speech, 1st September 1982
[54] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), p.604
[55] Financial Times editorial, ‘Mr Reagan’s failure’, 12th April 1983
[56] William E. Smith, ‘Seeking safety in numbers; Arafat says no to Hussein – and to Reagan’, Time magazine, 18th April 1983
[57] Mark Tessler, A History of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict (Indiana University, 1994), pp.619-620
[58] Yezid Sayigh, ‘Struggle within, struggle without: the transformation of PLO politics since 1982’, International Affairs, 1989/2/ p.265
[59] http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AMH/XX/MidEast/Lebanon-1982-1984/DOD-Report/index.html
[60] Thomas Friedman, ‘US warships fire on Lebanon area held by Damascus’, New York Times, 18th September 1983
[61] Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden, from the Soviet invasion to September 10, 2001 (Penguin, 2004), p.138
[62] William Claiborne, ‘Victory gives Israel new power in Mideast’, Washington Post, 19th June 1982
[63] Drew Middleton, ‘Syria’s build up called a tactic for talks’, New York Times, 12th May 1983
[64] Ihsan A.Hijazi, ‘Arafat says PLO rifts are healed’, New York Times, 2nd July 1984
[65] Thomas Friedman, ‘US warships fire on Lebanon area held by Damascus’, New York Times, 18th September 1983
[66] William Harris, ‘Syria in Lebanon’, Merip reports, July/August 1985
[67] James H. Scheuer, ‘How to stop Syria’, New York Times, 15th March 1984
[68] Loren Jenkins, ‘PLO, Syria talks fail to end rift’, Washington Post, 10th July 1983
[69] Charles Krauthammer, ‘Israel’s victory in Lebanon’, Washington Post, 18th January 1985
[70] Robert Fisk, Pity the Nation: Lebanon at War (Oxford University Press, 1992), p.468
[71] Judith Palmer Harik, Hezbollah: the changing face of terrorism, (I.B.Tauris, 2005), p.16
[72] Ibid, p.200
[73] Simon Murden, ‘Understanding Israel’s long conflict in Lebanon’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 2000, 27(1), p.35
[74] Ibid, p.46

New term - Arab-Israeli conflict

2006-01-14T15:31:00.000Z

Fitting in well with my essay - focusing on Zionism - and with current world events - Ariel Sharon's illness and forthcoming elections - means that my new course has extra relevance. After the core course which was not necessarily close to my background knowledge, I am on quite familiar ground here and the next 11 weeks should be much more in depth and analytical than before - as I would expect an MA to be. Although I don't compare myself to other students, I think that my background knowledge on the Arab - Israeli conflict was above average for the class. It is probably the one subject that I have read more about than any other prior to the course. It is certainly, to me, the most interesting and important issue in contemporary international relations.

A quarter of my current essay is on Zionism, as an example of a nationalist movement. From the outset on the course, I have tried to establish links between modules I take and have looked for overlaps to reinforce my knowledge - with the aim of having a very strong dissertation. My dissertation will be on Middle Eastern politics. My main idea at the moment is an analysis of 1979 as a year of significant developments within the Islamic world - both politically and spiritually - and the long term effects of these events. Namely the Islamic revolution in Iran; the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan; Saddam Hussein's seizure of power in Iraq and possibly the signing of the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt.

Another avenue I want to explore is producing some shorter pieces using material in my essays. These would have a contemporary slant. Anthony Beevor who gave a lecture on Total War to us in November, was on Channel 4 news this evening, discussing Gordon Brown's proposed British day - a celebration of a unified nation. There is a lot of scope here based on previous research - Hobsbawm's Inventing Traditions springs to mind.

History online.....

2006-01-03T10:36:00.000Z

After my last comments on archive technology, here is a link to bbc, who have put some of their archive footage online.... http://www.bbc.co.uk/calc/news/index.shtml

Essay plan....

2005-12-24T14:01:00.000Z

Here is my essay plan - advice is welcome...

Was the development of nationalism shaped by class interests? Illustrate by comparison of several nationalisms arising in different eras and regions?

Intro

Historical Background (500 words)
Enlightenment
French Revolution
Liberalism
Creole nationalism
Modernisation & Industrialisation

Theory and Historiography (500 words)
Marxist theory
Anderson: Print capitalism & Creole nationalism
Development of vernacular
Gellner & modernisation
Hobsbawm & education
Official nationalisms

Class interests objectives – a comparison (3500 words)

· Secessionist: Basque/Welsh
· Aspirational: Serbian
· Displaced: Zionism
· Anti-Imperial: Arab

Conclusion (500 words)

Class interests and their goals. The objectives of nationalist movements can be divided and defined by what they are against and what they have to overcome. The driving force to nationalism has been the interests of certain areas of society. Nationalism must have a goal however this goal will not always be the same for separate parts of society. Class interests will vary with these varying objectives.

The development of nationalism was shaped not by factors such as language, religion, race or culture, but by class interests. Nationalism like any other ideology has an objective and that objective of gaining political power; different class groups used nationalism to gain political power and advance their own class interests. The objective of different class groups can be divided between ……….

Will history forgive anyone.....

2005-12-24T13:50:00.000Z

A very relevant article in the New Statesman recently http://www.newstatesman.com/200512190017
The value of history whether in education or current affairs seems to be an ever growing hot topic. Coinciding with my studies... Its value as a political tool is growing exponentially. Firstly as advances in archive technology and freedom of information provide better access to events in the past. Secondly as we live in fast changing and difficult times where the future is seen with increasing intrepidation; creating an equation between past present and future is a political requisite...

On this particular quote, since history has become more and more politicised and subjective, then history will probably forgive them. After all some historians believe that Hiroshima, Vietnam, etc were justified.

Christmas break .....

2005-12-24T13:33:00.000Z

Time for another blog. Apologies for the lack of posts since end of November - I have been busy, I assure you!

After finishing my background reading, have got an essay plan together, which I will put in the next post. Met my tutor and have written 1,000 words thus far. So with 1 month till the deadline, I think I am on track. But have got a 1 week break now, so hope to get over half way by the end of the year. This stage is certainly more enjoyable than long hours in the library, although it can be quite painstaking, as each sentence can take an age to construct, and even then I might edit it out later. But that is all part of the process - the sum is greater than all the parts.

Sloggin away...

2005-11-27T09:16:00.000Z

Been putting in the hours recently - so been pretty much braindead when returning to the my laptop - so the blog has gone down in the priorities. I have decided to go for the nationalism question. Firstly because it is one of the questions asking for an argument to be constructed rather than a historical narrative, which is something I prefer, although I would like to undertake the latter on this course at some point. The subject matter is quite universal, meaning that the work I do now will provide a solid background and foundation for the rest of the course. I have been reading about Arab nationalism and Zionism, and I will be doing further Middle East studies. The other questions don't necessarily have this, since all politics and international relations can be considered through the nationalism prism, genocide for example is not a concept linked to all states, as is Fascism or Empire - directly at least.

After being daunted by the size of the subject, I am slowly narrowing things down. I have discovered some valuable texts that cover the essay question well. In particular as regards zionism and also Arab nationalism.

Nationalism .......... possible essay

2005-11-04T21:39:00.000Z

Been looking at nationalism over the last week. It's a pretty wide ranging topic, since its relevant to virtually every country or state. I've been focusing on its origins, which lie mid way through the 19th century, and some specific types of nationalism - Hindu and Arab in particular. Although one of the essay questions, is on nationalism, so this reading is directly relevant to that, I was looking at the other essay questions today and nationalism is a vital concept that needs discussing in those as well. Like the state, it is a central concept to international relations theory. Other possible essays could be on genocide or imperialism or totalitarianism and to understand these, I think you need to have a satisfactory understanding of nationalism first. So this work here is important and will do me good for the future. In fact if you look at each of the weekly topics, it's obvious now that they are strongly interlinked, whereas at the start of the course, I thought some were quite autonomous. So it's going to be necessary to do core reading and further reading each week as comprehensively as possible, regardless of the essay i answer.

As regards the essay: the question is based on whether class interests shaped nationalism. My initial thoughts on approach was that it would be to look at the genesis of nationalism and what social elements drove that forward, then see whether this was repeated elsewhere. I was thinking of dedicating the first half of the essay to comparing late 19th century European nationalism to Latin American nationalism then the second to 20th century forms such as Zionism and Arabism.

Also need to do some research on essay writing skills...... before I start.... although my essays over the last year have been pretty good, my structure and style is quite improvised and obviously could be improved....

Empire - What is it?

2005-10-24T22:32:00.000Z

Tonight, we discussed empires: what is the meaning of empire? what type of empires are there? what are the problems related to them? and how do they end? The definition is not necessarily geographical or politically based, but something more abstract. Size, prestige and dominance are the key characteristics. So although the United States is not an empire in the geographical sense with global territories, it does have those 3 traits. Although you could argue that US military prescence across the globe makes it empirical. Having a solid sphere of influence as the United States does in its region could also define it as an empire. Then again, you could say that an empire is really just a large state - if that's your definition. I'll stop there, as that's a possible essay question.

But reading about how empires developed, you find that economic factors play a greater and greater role. The industrial revolution and an excess of capital, fuelled 19th century colonialism, as demand for resources became capitalist's priority. To answer the essay question - Is US an Empire? - then it would be important to consider US demand for resources - it's all about oil! It's a well known cry, but sadly it's very true.

Here is an article that gives some further information on US energy policy and the politics that drive it.

http://www.opendemocracy.net/conflict-americanpower/oil_2887.jsp

American Power: Global Sheriff – International Outlaw?

2005-10-19T19:46:00.000Z

Tonight I attended my first public debate of the term at LSE. These excellent events are a great resource and forum for ideas, free to attend and always entertaining. This evening’s debate was between Professor Paul Rogers of University of Bradford and Professor Bill Wohlforth of Dartmouth University, USA. Below is a prose summarisation of the debate.

To quote the Chinese saying, we live in “interesting times”. The United States is not an international outlaw. Its compliance rate with the vast majority of international treaties is very high; it does resist new treaties but only when they are not in line with US foreign policy. This does not make the United States an international outlaw. It operates in a passive sheriff role often, such as its enforcement of its treaty with Japan preventing Japan’s development of nuclear weapons. Its actions are mostly responses to the demands of intervention. The last 15 years has seen a shift to interventionism in international relations. When it does intervene it is not necessarily alone. In recent conflicts, whether in Yugoslavia, Afghanistan or Iraq, it has intervened with allies.

The post Cold War period has seen major changes in state of world security: a 40% decline in global conflicts; 35% decrease in world arms sales. The world is a safer place as a result and the United States poses less threat to international threat stability.

The Neo-con phase which peaked in 2003 is now over. The US electorate has seen the failings of this policy and has shown itself to be shifting away from President Bush. Other politicians are also trying to distance themselves from this policy as well. The idea of the United States as an international outlaw is fading in the Iraq quagmire.

******

There have been some very dangerous developments in the global security environment in the last 5-6 years. What we are now seeing is an “Entry strategy” being set up in Iraq that will effect the geopolitical situation for the next 20 to 30 years.

The ideological foundation for these developments is the right wing think tank Project for New American Century, established in 1997, and incorporating both current Bush administration and early Reagan officials. The combination of Christian / Zionist beliefs and Neo-conservatism marked a new era of US foreign policy, where the role of Sheriff and Outlaw has often been mixed up.

The aim of the September 11th terrorist attacks was in part to draw the United States into a protracted war in Afghanistan, where they would be bogged down like the Soviet Union in the 1980s and suffer high military casualties. This did not happen as heavy aerial bombing, special operations tactics and a rearmed Northern Alliance, brought a swift victory. Rogers encountered a Bush official in Washington in 2002, who said that doing Iraq meant not having to do Iran. The speed of victory and hubris that went with the Afghan victory encouraged preparation for this new war. Arms manufacturers had to operate 24/7 for the next 10 months to provide enough ammunition for Iraq.

The termination of the Iraqi regime has provided an opportunity for a revitalised Al-Qaida. Al-Qaida’s long term goals have become more apparent. The restoration of a Caliphate being an ultimate one. The resolution of the Israeli occupation of Palestine is a side issue. The greatest Caliphate between 750 and 1250 had its capital as Baghdad, now occupied the US, thus antagonising this movement further. Iraq has now become the ideal training ground for jihadis, where Afghan paramilitaries now go to Iraq to receive training to fight in Afghanistan.

The siege of Fallujah in November 2004 could be seen from two very different perspectives: the abundant TV crews in embedded US army patrols and the Al-Jazeera Arab journalists broadcasting images of dead civilians to the Middle East. This split in perspectives defines the current situation in the Middle East.

The Iraq war was not driven by a need to increase the United States oil power base, but by long term trends. The importance of the Persian Gulf has become ever increasing. Its initial moment of significance was the start of the Yom Kippur war on October 17th 1973 and the oil embargo that followed. Now it would not be surprising if the US has bases in Iraq in 10 years time. Al-Qaida should be looked at as a symptom of these current trends rather than an entity in its own right. The next question is the invasion of Iran. Iran feels surrounded by United States and feels nuclear weapons are needed to defend itself.

Since September 11th, the United States has gone badly wrong on foreign policy, behaved in an outlandish way and needs to change its long term security strategy to get out of this predicament.

Previous work

2005-10-16T23:24:00.000Z

I haven't worked out how to link to word documents yet, but this is one of my previous essays.

What challenges does transnational terrorism pose to the international system?

The conventional definition of terrorism is an act or threat of violence to achieve a political objective, of a regional or national nature. When using the term transnational terrorism, the properties of traditional terrorism are retained, but shifted to a dimension beyond these national considerations. So the funding, infrastructure, and personnel have a multinational form; the acts of terrorism can occur anywhere internationally; and the objectives of the terrorists are not limited by international boundaries. By operating without regard for national frontiers and international laws, terrorist groups force the individual states to respond collectively, but the challenge for the international system is how best to co-ordinate this response.

Historically acts of terrorism have aimed to achieve a regional or national socio-political objective. Likewise the actual acts of terrorism have been against local targets or interests related to those local targets. With often limited funds and limited objectives, terrorism has had a narrow remit for its struggle.

Terrorism’s origins can be traced to the 11th century Middle East, where the Hashshashin murdered their enemies through low level tactics. Terrorism has always existed as a tool of insurgency and as a way of seeking political change. It is only since the start of the post war period, that it has become an organized and self conscious phenomenon. The Irgun in Israel adopted terrorist tactics in its attempt to establish a Jewish state. As did the Algerian FLN undertook a terrorist campaign in 1954, in its war of independence against France. Terrorist groups slowly shifted their operations onto the international stage, partly to hit softer targets and partly to gain international attention. The Provisional IRA was one of the first local militant groups to undertake this migration, attacking targets on the UK mainland in the 1970s.

Transnational terrorism was born in the early 1970s. The Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO) always held the same central objective, the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, but experienced a similar shift to the IRA, albeit more rapid, in the direction of its terrorist campaign. They fought a prolonged guerrilla war against their ‘occupier’, but also exported this campaign beyond the Middle East and into mainland Europe. Hijackings, hostage taking and assassinations were commonplace in the 1970s, mostly against Israeli targets or targets loosely connected to Israel.

Historically terrorism has been counteracted at a local level, internal disputes have been dealt with through internal laws or force if necessary. As terrorist groups formed into transnational structures with transnational plots, the international community has, slower than perhaps originally anticipated, responded collectively. International mechanisms, such as UN Resolutions or law enforcement treaties, have slowly developed to counteract the growing threat.

Terrorism became truly transnational during the 1990s. Militant Islamic groups, having been formed during the Afghanistan war against the Soviet Union, tried to spread their struggle across the Middle East and into Western Europe. Although regional grievances, were a driving force – whether US military presence in Saudi Arabia or the Israel-Palestinian conflict – the groups involved formed transnational structures, aiming at US targets, regardless of where they were. During the 1990s targets ranging from New York to Riyadh to Nairobi were all attacked. Militant Islam previously was concerned with parochial grievances, such as attempts to overthrow governments in Algeria and Egypt, but a shift in strategy by Al-Qaeda from the ‘lesser enemy’ to the ‘greater enemy’ occurred in the mid 1990s. This shift would galvanise the support of disparate militant groups operating at the time. [1]

The term transnational is defined as transcending national boundaries. A transnational organization can be defined by the types of movements it undertakes: movement of physical objects, including human populations; movement of money or credit; and movement of information and ideas. A transnational terrorist organization such as Al-Qaeda fits this definition through its movement of personnel across the Middle East and especially prior to October 2001 through Afghanistan; its transfer of funds through the international financial system via Islamic charities, unsuspecting legitimate businesses, organized crime and other money laundering ventures; and its intent to spread a militant radical form of Wahhabism Islam. One of the ultimate aims of Al-Qaeda, is the creation of a transnational Islamic superstate or Caliphate.

Although transnational terrorism is not committed solely by Islamic groups, the international system has had to respond to this threat specifically. As the response incorporates cultural and religious factors, it has provided a greater challenge to states. How states respond to political Islam is discussed later.

***

Terrorist groups have traditionally operated as non-state actors: vehemently opposing states and their policies. However the distinction between terrorists and the states has blurred, when states have used terrorism as a proxy for conflict, providing logistical support, funds and arms to these groups. When terrorism is state sponsored, the threat to international order increases, since the culpability cannot be simply passed off onto an unaccountable rogue group.

State terrorism became an international issue in the 1980s, having previously only existed in a covert capacity. Palestinian affiliated groups had been the main perpetrators of terrorist acts throughout the 1970s, but never received consistent state backing. Transnational terrorism would gain greater momentum from the growing regional influence of states such as Syria, Iran and Libya.

The transition from terrorism being the perpetrated by rogue groups to individual states, albeit indirectly, made the issue international. The bombing of a West Berlin nightclub in April 1986 led to US air strikes on Libya 10 days later, and was the first occasion in modern times that an act of terrorism had created an inter state conflict.

Although the US and Libya had clashed covertly previously, the bombing presented a challenge to the international system, as it polarised international opinions on the appropriate response to such acts. Operation El Dorado Canyon was condemned by France, the Soviet Union and all Arab states, but supported by Britain, Australia and Israel.

The prosecution of terrorist groups through international law enforcement was a laborious and frustrating process, so the US – having suffered a series of terrorist acts in the 1970s and early 1980s – decided to prosecute individual states, who it perceived as the driving force.[2] As states are unable to attack other states in open conflict, terrorism has been used, as a way to stay within international law and attack other states covertly. As will be discussed later, the link between states and terrorism is complex and states have tried to establish links, so as to justify their own policies.

***

The growth of transnational terrorist groups has meant that very few states within the international system are unaffected. Historical alliances within Western Europe and the Middle East have been reshaped as greater preventative co-operation has developed, with other states playing important roles. The international system has always operated in a state structure, through institutions such as the UN or alliances like NATO. But the nature of transnational terrorism is that it is not state defined, so a new approach has been adopted. Ideological and religious factors are harder to counteract with traditional interstate methods.

As terrorism developed from a local to a transnational issue, international institutions responded. Since 1963, 12 major conventions and protocols have been established by the United Nations relating to states’ responsibilities in combating terrorism. These range from civil aviation safety to attacks on senior government officials and diplomats to the financing of terrorism. Additionally numerous UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions have been passed – relating to specific terrorist incidents. The UN is made up of many different organizations, agencies and programmes, which also have counterterrorist functions. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is concerned with the proliferation of nuclear materials to terrorists. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) deals with airline and airport security. The Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (ODCCP) looks at the links between drug trafficking, organised crime and terrorism.[3]

Greater coordination in law enforcement has underpinned these international agreements. Terrorism is ultimately a criminal activity and has been recognised as such, on an international level since the 54th General Assembly in Washington in 1985 when Resolution AGN/54/RES/1 was passed calling for the creation of a specialized group within Interpol’s Police Division to 'co-ordinate and enhance co-operation in combating international terrorism'.[4]

International law enforcement agencies were exposed as failing to effectively prevent terrorism, firstly by the September 11th attacks and then the 2004 Madrid bombings. Agencies like Europol, established in 1999 after the relaxation of European border controls, have increased in importance, as inter state co-operation has become a necessity. At the US-EU summit on counterterrorism cooperation in May 2002, both sides of the Atlantic agreed to joint initiatives covering terrorist funding, extradition laws, criminal trend data, identifying of terrorist organisations and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

The Madrid terrorist attacks underlined the need for a coherent EU anti-terrorism policy. A summit held in the wake of the attacks proposed the creation of a ‘counter-terrorism czar’, enforcement of the use of the European Common Arrest Warrant, and creating a clearer definition of the term ‘terrorism’. Europol’s effect had been limited; as its remit did not include a coherent anti-terror policy.[5]

Despite a long history of cooperation between international intelligence organisations, recent acts of terrorism have forced governments to re-examine the effectiveness of this co-operation. Traditionally strong ties have existed between US and Western European intelligence agencies, having worked closely during the Cold War. The expansion of operations by Middle Eastern and South Asian terrorist groups has required a reciprocated expansion of intelligence gathering as a counterterrorist measure.

After the September 11th terrorist attacks, the United States sought greater co-operation with countries with far from obliquitous reputations. The intelligence agencies of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Iran contain elements sympathetic to terrorist groups, but were asked to provide assistance for US investigations. States without any history of international co-operation in intelligence operations have also been brought into the fold. This spread of co-operation travels from North African states, such as Morocco and Algeria to South East Asian states, including the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia.
"The extent of co-operation with other intelligence agencies around the world is unprecedented, as is the willingness on the part of many governments - including some unexpected ones - to co-operate,"[6]

***

Establishing conventions and structures to deal with terrorism is only a limited solution and an obvious one at that. Given that terrorism is not arbitrary and has an ultimate objective, governments or groups of governments have to look at the root causes of terrorism; either to develop a way of eliminating by means such as force or to consider how to resolve the issues driving it.

The creation of transnational mechanisms is a preventative move against terrorism, but ultimately states are forced to undertake a deeper analysis of the causes of terrorism. In a recent interview, Tony Blair’s analysis was that it was possible to “take security and military measures against terrorism but ... the best prospect of peaceful coexistence [lied] in the spread of democracy and human rights".[7]

Terrorism is a method of conflict used to achieve certain goals, but it is driven by a combination of factors including economic inequality, political misrepresentation, religious tension and ideological conflict. All acts of terrorism are motivated by at least one of these factors. Governments have ultimately needed to look at these factors, when constructing their response to terrorism.

Transnational terrorism developed as a result of migration from the Middle East and North Africa, but is driven by globalisation. The end of East-West confrontation, rapid developments in means of communication, easing of travel restrictions, greater fluidity in international finance markets, changed the face of terrorism.[8] Immigration control is a key preventative measure against transnational terrorism. Porous borders in the Middle East and also in Europe have led to a proliferation of terrorist groups in terms of personnel, ideology and expertise, and international agreements on immigration (in particular within the EU) have been renegotiated since the increased threat of transnational terrorism.
The structure of transnational terrorism has changed as a result of globalisation and counterterrorist measures have had to respond to this change. Globalisation has opened new opportunities for terrorists and presented new challenges to state security. The proliferation of information and ideology has travelled from the Middle East across to South East Asia, through religious teachings and technologies like the internet. Post Cold War economic development has been driven by privatisation, deregulation, the free movement of capital and labour, and technological advances, which has in turn fed the finances of terrorist groups. Globalisation has allowed non state transnational entities, such as terrorist groups, freedom to flourish in a more economically liberal world. It is estimated that the terrorist economy - including legitimate businesses, drug trafficking, organised crime and arms sales - could be valued at up to $1.5 trillion.[9] The extent to which transnational terrorism has integrated into global systems, has presented unprecedented challenges to the international system, leading to the need for greater co-operation. ***
Regional terrorism is normally resolved by regional actors, with occasional assistance from a neutral party. Attempts to resolve the Northern Ireland troubles have been undertaken by the British and Irish governments, with input from US Senator George Mitchell on the issue of decommissioning. This is the traditional model for resolving regional issues that give rise to terrorism. Transnational terrorism is more complicated as it involves more actors and its remedy is often less defined.

The conflict between Israel and the Palestinians is essentially a regional political and geographical conflict, but it has become a transnational issue, as it has drawn in other states. Palestinian terrorist groups have been supported by states such as Iran and Syria, likewise Israel’s response to terrorism has been endorsed by the United States. Palestinian terrorism is unique in that although its objectives are regional, its practice, backing and the response to it has been transnational.

Modern terrorism has developed as Western societies have formed complex multicultural structures. The spread of political Islam has been across national boundaries; as a result disillusionment in one country can be determined by the situation in another state. Muslims have opposed government foreign policy in states such as Iraq, despite not sharing any common national identity. Acts of terrorism that have followed are caused in part by this interdependence. Transnational terrorism is driven by transnational causes – one state’s foreign policy can fuel acts of terrorism against it. The Madrid bombs were seen as an act of revenge against Spain’s involvement in the invasion of Iraq. Muslim communities exist across Europe, and as the Madrid bombs showed, Western societies need to strike the balance between protecting these communities and having effective law enforcement.

Western governments have been consistently intransigent in the face of groups like Al-Qaida, but they would not deny, that they are ultimately seeking to resolve some of the grievances that are also driving terrorism. Greater equality and democratic rights in the Middle Eastern countries, resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and a peaceful end to the US occupation of Iraq, are political objectives shared by Western governments and these terrorists. Al-Qaeda has tried to divide the international community by exploiting the divisions between US and Europe in how to treat these causes of terrorism. [10]

Foreign policy has played a major role in driving modern terrorism. Al-Qaeda has cited US foreign policy - whether support of Israel, a military presence in Saudi Arabia or imposing strict sanctions against Iraq during the 1990s – as its prime motivation. The United States response to the September 11th attacks has been criticised because it further antagonised militant Islamic movements, firstly in Afghanistan and then Iraq. States opposing the invasion of Iraq cited growth of terrorism as one of their major concerns. Divisions in the international response towards terrorism have been created by contrasting internal politics, historical standpoints on international issues and established alliances with other states. For example France’s opposition to the invasion of Iraq was partly driven by having a large Arab population, strong historical ties in the Middle East and a centre left government.

As transnational terrorism operates outside national boundaries, the response traverses national boundaries, which in turn can jeopardise individual state sovereignty. Terrorist groups who reside in certain states may become retaliatory targets, for example Israel has targeted Hamas activists in Syria, and in February 2004 Russia assassinated the Chechen rebel Zelimkhan Yanderbiyev in Qatar.[11] As terrorist groups now operate with an international infrastructure, states have had to respond across borders. The international system has had to strike a balance between defending a state’s right to manage its own internal affairs and to prevent states from (if not always intentionally) harbouring terrorist groups.

Preserving this balance has been pushed to the limit, in the case of Afghanistan and Iraq. Both states were accused of supporting terrorism. Both invasions received mixed international support: Middle Eastern states generally opposed both; Western states mostly favoured the former but only a handful the latter. When the response to terrorism is interstate – the international community does not always share the same outlook.

The preservation of international law has been a critical issue for the international system, both in terms of preserving state sovereignty when dealing with counterterrorist measures and preservation of human rights. The law enforcement measures discussed earlier have had to consider human rights legislation. Although clear differences have emerged, with European powers understanding how consideration of human rights in law enforcement is crucial to stemming the growth of terrorism. The United States has adopted a more draconian approach to counter terrorist law enforcement.

***

Prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the US State Department designated seven states as state sponsors of terrorism: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Sudan and Syria. This linkage between states and terrorist groups may be framed by one state’s definition. “State sponsors of terrorism impede the efforts of the United States and the international community to fight terrorism. These countries provide a critical foundation for terrorist groups. Without state sponsors, terrorist groups would have a much more difficult time obtaining the funds, weapons, materials, and secure areas they require to plan and conduct operations.”[12] Other states may not always share this assessment, partly through their own intelligence, partly because of their own definitions of the term ‘state sponsor’. Some Arab states believe Israel’s policies during the current Intifada constitute state terrorism. Although Israel might not support individual terrorist groups, its operations against Palestinians fall within certain definitions of terrorism. The links between states and terrorism are also often hard to prove. The US government tried to assert a link between the September 11th terrorists and Iraqi intelligence, in the build up to the invasion. Iraq was also accused of providing a safe haven for Islamist group Ansar al-Islam, despite being ideological opposites. Unclear and divided definitions present the international system with a challenge when providing a clear and unified response to terrorism.

An independent terrorist group is harder to counteract than a group that relies on state funding. The process of being able to successfully link states to terrorist groups, which begun under the Reagan administration, has underpinned counter terrorist foreign policy. The use of economic sanctions had been the standard counter measure, prior to recent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Their effectiveness is limited in comparison to military or covert actions, but has been successful with certain states. The imposition of sanctions on Libya, eventually led to the extradition of two agents suspected of involvement in the 1988 Pan-Am bombing. Sanctions have also been used to encourage co-operation in fighting terrorism: Pakistan had its previous sanctions waived in exchange for supporting the United States attempts to overthrow the Taliban in October 2001.

Issues driving transnational terrorism have often been resolved through diplomatic means. As discussed earlier, terrorist groups are often reliant on state sponsorship, a role Syria and Iran have both recently been accused of. Western states fear that state sponsorship can empower a terrorist group with biological or chemical weapons, but this threat of terrorism is often overstated to maintain diplomatic pressure. States like Iran and Syria have been accused of harbouring terrorists, developing WMD and financing terrorist groups. The reality is that the threat from transnational terrorism has been developed as much by non state actors. The blackmarket for nuclear technology was developed by Pakistani scientist Dr Abdul Qadeer Khan in the 1990s, supposedly without state knowledge. Charities and businesses in the Middle East channel funds to terrorist groups in large quantities.

***

Since almost all modern forms of terrorism have a transnational element, the international system will always have to respond, but whereas terrorism has developed a transnational structure; the international system has not always mirrored this effectively with transnational countermeasures of its own. Traditional responses to terrorism - whether sanctions and conflict at the state level, or intelligence and law enforcement at sub state level - have not always succeeded, as individual states have not always been united in their responses.

[1] Al-Qaeda: Casting a shadow of terror, Jason Burke p.149-150
[2] World Politics since 1945, Peter Calvocoressi P101.
[3] UN website: The United Nations system and terrorism

[4]Interpol website: Interpol’s involvement in the fight against international terrorism
[5]BBC news online: The European terror challenge, 24/03/2004
[6] Financial Times: A Catastrophic failure of Intelligence, 29/11/2001 – unnamed CIA official.
[7] The Guardian: The Twin Pillars, 20/01/2005 – Tony Blair interviewed by Timothy Garton Ash.
[8] International Terrorism: What kinds of response? Rohan Gunaratna. http://www.un-globalsecurity.org/
[9] Modern Jihad Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks by Loretta Napoleoni. Extract in The Guardian 3/11/2003
[10] See BBC News 15/04/2004. Straw rejects Bin Laden truce. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk_politics/3627943.stm
[11] See also US assassination of Al-Qaeda suspects in Yemen – November 2002. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2402479.stm
[12] Overview of State Sponsored Terrorism, US Department. http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/31944.pdf

Library time

2005-10-16T23:06:00.000Z

Finally got to spend some quality time in the library - 5 hours saturday; 4 hours today. Just going through the core reading plus some further stuff. Been reading Eric Hobsbawm's Age of Empire, I really like his writing style - its very succint but also sufficiently informative. Maybe it was my state of mind, but every paragraph could be dwelt on and gave options for further research around the topic. And he is a Birkbeck emeritus prof as well! The location of Birkbeck is very inspiring, Malet street (where the main buildings of the university are) is a wide tree lined street, and even though it is central , it doesn't get too much traffic flowing through. It does put a spring in your step arriving there. I was also accepted to study at London met in Holloway, but I think that location would have uninspired. I remember the grounds of Nottingham University and imagined that such a location inspired thought and ideas in students. Its nearly 9 years on since i started my undergraduate degree, but my interest in studying is on a completely different level now. Different circumstances, maturity and some worldly experiences in between have made the difference. But having an interest and interaction with the world is one of my mantras, understanding the how we got here of world is the study of history, and by looking at the previous I take the optimistic viewpoint that things can be changed from that understanding. The process of learning is so important, it's very easy to stand still in this world. And studying in one of the best Universities in one of the most culturally rich cities in the world feels pretty damm good!

The State - some background....

2005-10-10T23:40:00.000Z

Where did the concept of The State develop? The roots of States are found in the notion of blood ties or generically in tribes. This standard form of mutual respect through kinship or blood relations is the starting point for State development. Tribes have a basic organisational structure, with key actors - the chieftan, the warrior and the religious leader - always present. These actors fullfil the basic requirements of the community - keeping the peace in the homeland; fighting abroad; defending religion. It was this structure that formed a basic social system until 18th-19th century.

The main developments which built on this basic structure were events such as the French revolution; the Enlightenment. A major shift in the State's significance though came from changes in military practice and technology. Advances in fortifications and weaponry, i.e. gunpowder, set this process in motion. This development required both funding and a bureaucratic structure behind it. In turn to operate this structure the State needed to educate its constituents. The Napoleonic period created a "Nation in Arms", both by the education provided and internal security apparatus. The prison system was first developed in this period. To gain consent of its people the State needed to establish a balanced community of interests: greater involvement in housing, sanitation, welfare were ways to look after subjects.

Latterly in the immediate post war period, the NHS was established - paying back the people for the suffering of the previous 30 years. But having established State control over institutions, this has been slowly relinquished, through privatisation.

Course programme

2005-10-10T21:41:00.000Z

Week 1 - Introduction

Week 2 - The State

Week 3 - Imperialism

Week 4 - Empires

Week 5 -Nationalism

Week 6 - Nation-building

Week 7 - Fascism

Week 8 - War

Week 9 - Totalitarianism

Week 10 - Genocide

Week 11 - Globalisation

Getting started...

2005-10-09T23:28:00.000Z

Just getting into the background reading for week 1 - The State.. The development of state apparatus - police and prisons; education system; welfare services..

Full immersion

2005-10-07T18:53:00.000Z

Going to have to quickly strike balance b/ work, study and relaxation.......

9-5 work - 7-9 study - Mon to Thurs

12-4 study - Sat

10-4 study - Sun

18 hours a week? How does that sound?

Week1

2005-10-07T18:42:00.000Z

Induction on wednesday - seem a nice bunch of people...

This blog.....

2005-10-07T18:33:00.000Z

.....intends to provide some up to date info on my MA, which started this week at Birkbeck University London, and the work I am doing around it. The course - MA in Contemporary History and Politics - is a two year part time degree - with one 2 hour seminar per week to start with. It is assessed by essays and dissertation; the seminars involve lectures, presentations (not assessed) and discussions.

I'll try and keep you posted (deadlines dependent) on the weekly topics studies, external lectures attended, pieces written whether as part of course or not, current news stories I think are interesting, websites and texts of value, and political events such as protests or conferences. Basically anything political or historical; academic or journalistic; and nothing frivolous, biased or myopic.